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Introduction
The interest in the thought of the unidentified writer known as Pseudo-Dionysius
(hereafter referred to as Dionysius) has rapidly gained momentum over the past century
particularly through the advent of postmodern thought. Debate has raged in the field of
specifically French philosophy as to whether or not the theological method of Dionysius
sidesteps the charge of unduly proposing a metaphysical position despite attempts to limit
theological language. The scene has included philosophers Jean-Luc Marion arguing in
the affirmative and Jacques Derrida claiming that the Dionysian method of talking about
God is merely more metaphysics, “metaphysics” being the primary byword in
postmodern philosophical thought. In the theological world, the question as to the
orthodoxy and usefulness of Dionysius, particularly in light of these philosophical
debates, likewise has been relevant. Is Dionysius merely a Neoplatonic wolf in Christian
clothing, or is he (or she) Christian enough to consult when it comes to determining the
proper usage of theology?1 Does the apophaticism of Dionysius, when accepted,
constitute a fundamental obstacle for any affirmative theological project?
All of these contemporary interests in Dionysius swirl around a few important
questions that any theologian should consider: Can we know anything about God in this
life? What is the extent of possible knowledge concerning the divine, given the revelation
of Scripture and Christ Incarnate? It is sometimes thought that Dionysius disparages the
use of concepts that refer to God and his attributes, and therefore of any positive
statement about theology. In response, the goal of my paper is to clarify precisely what
the Dionysian method is, how it values affirmative theology as good and necessary, and
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Examples of the former include classically Martin Luther and, more recently, noted Dionysian
scholar Paul Rorem. These perspectives, along with that of Marion and Derrida, will be discussed below.
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how Dionysius and two later important theologians within the Christian tradition, the
medieval Thomas Aquinas and the modern Hans Urs von Balthasar, have used the
Dionysian method in ways that display its epistemological and religious usefulness in
doing theology. The Dionysian method used in his mystical theology, particularly as
highlighted through the interpretive and appropriative lenses of affirmative theologians
like Thomas Aquinas and Hans Urs von Balthasar, offers a way for an appraisal of
affirmative theology as valuable and essential, while simultaneously ranking it as the first
means to the supreme end of Christian life and practice. This supreme end is being in
right relationship with God Himself, rather than knowledge of God. For Dionysius,
concepts are merely a stepping-stone on the path of relating to God who is beyond all
knowledge.
Excursus on Terminology
Further clarification is in order. What exactly is meant by a “Dionysian method”
or a “Dionysian methodology”? Without overstepping what will be shown below, the
Dionysian method consists of two parts, one part being founded upon the other. The
foundational part of the Dionysian method is a particular theology proper, that is, a
particular way of conceptualizing the fundamental nature of God. It is no surprise to the
initiated that Dionysius is famous for influencing the trend in Christian theology known
as apophatic theology, or the via negativa as is sometimes called in the West. This
theological tendency is fundamentally aware that, though kataphatic (or “positive” or
“affirmative”) theology is able to bring the believer to a gracious amount of knowledge
concerning the divine and his works, there is nonetheless a limit on what language and
concepts can properly grasp about God’s nature or essence. God’s transcendence implies
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that his vastness is incomprehensible by thought or word.2 Therefore, for apophatic
theology the emphasis is to respect and be mindful of the fundamental limits of language
when discussing a transcendent God. However, this does not imply that kataphatic
language is thereby to be sloughed off completely. Instead, there is an intimate play
between what is revealed in kataphatic theology and what kataphatic theology fails to
truly comprehend through language. One cannot develop an apophatic consciousness
unless prompted through an affirmative statement on who God is and what can be known
about him. Fundamentally, the Dionysian method begins with the affirmation that the
immanent God who reveals in authoritative revelation and even through Christ Himself
also is the transcendent God that reason and language cannot possibly bring to a full
comprehension for the believer.
The second part of the Dionysian method, founded on this apophatic conception
of God, is what I will call a meta-theology. This meta-theology tries to ask the question,
“What are we to do with theology in light of this fact? What is the purpose of doing
theology if God is ultimately beyond our ability to fully conceive of him?” The answer
for the meta-theology of the Dionysian method is not found in merely coming to a better
academic understanding of God. Though coming to an understanding has inherent value
(again, the respect of kataphatic theology is still meaningful), the apophatic end of the
Dionysian theology gives little reason to suspect that such an effort as a final end will be
fulfilled. In fact, gaining knowledge can never be an end for orthodox Christianity, since,
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By incomprehensible, it is meant in a more etymological sense that knowledge of God cannot be
fully contained in man’s search to understand him at least in this life.

3

according to the apostle Paul, “knowledge puffs up, but love builds up” (1 Cor. 8:1).3
Knowledge is a tool, a catalyst, a jumping-off point for something else. In the Christian
life, that something else is a relationship of praise to God. Praise is the ultimate reaction
to a God that is revealed and yet also exceeds all that is revealed immeasurably. This is
the final end and goal of all theology, kataphatic and apophatic. It will be shown below
that one can certainly find this method in the Dionysian corpus. Though Aquinas was
inherently seeing Dionysius through Western scholastic eyes, yet he nonetheless had in
mind the Dionysian method, particularly its consequences for a theological epistemology.
Balthasar, on the other hand, was more keenly aware of the aesthetic dimensions that
drive theology to its proper Dionysian end. Both efforts to appropriate the Dionysian
method were thus instances of what Balthasar might call “seeing the form”4 of the
Dionysian method from their own cultural and temporal contexts, all while this form
informs their distinct affirmative theological projects.
Scholarly Oppositions
One consequence of Dionysius’ apparent subordination of affirmative theological
statements is that many read him to consider theological speech and systematization as
inferior or unbecoming of the true spiritual person. For example, Charles Taliaferro and
Chad Meister appear to view Dionysius as such. In their masterful introductory work
Contemporary Philosophical Theology, they define philosophical theology as involving

3

Unless otherwise noted, all biblical passages referenced are in the New Revised Standard

Version.
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This is in reference to volume one of Balthasar’s The Glory of the Lord, which is entitled Seeing
the Form. This will be expounded upon further below. As a preemptive summary of this turn of phrase,
Aquinas and Balthasar see one and the same phenomenon that is the Dionysian method through different
historical, cultural, and theological perspectives.
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“…critical, disciplined reflection on the concept of God or the divine.”5 For Taliaferro
and Meister, the nature of the enterprise of philosophical theology is such that it can be
practiced “…both on the inside or the outside” of the particular religious tradition
examined; philosophical theology can be done within the context of belief in a particular
concept of God, or on the outside of said context, whether critical or sympathetic.
Following this definition, they begin to address objections to the prospect of doing
philosophical theology, and it is their addressing of the problem of mystery, and in
particular their apparent characterization of the position of Dionysius on this topic, that
we will turn to now.
Taliaferro and Meister quote Dionysius from his longest work entitled The Divine
Names, which I will repeat here: “Indeed the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every
rational process. Nor can any words come up to the inexpressible Good, this One, this
Source of all unity, this supra-existent Being. Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech, it
is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name.”6 From the display of this
quote, Taliaferro and Meister have implicitly interpreted Dionysius as being among those
throughout history who say that all rational inquiry concerning the nature and attributes
of God is fruitless and inappropriate. After accurately describing apophatic theology as
“theology that stresses the unknowability of God,” they set up the remainder of their
chapter on mystery by posing these important questions:
But must all discourse of the divine be by way of negation? Is it impossible to talk
about God? Is philosophical theology a contradiction in terms? While we have
sympathies for the apophatic theological tradition, we also take to heart the words
5

Charles Taliaffero and Chad Meister, Contemporary Philosophical Theology (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2016), loc. 69-76, Kindle.
6

Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm
Luibheid and Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 49-50.
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of the Apostle Paul: “I believed, and so I spoke” (2 Corinthians 4: 13). And we
affirm the value of Anselm’s motto, fides quaerens intellectum (“faith seeking
understanding”), taken not to mean that theological understanding must be based
on an irrational intellectual leap, but rather to mean an active trust that is seeking
a deeper understanding of God and the ways of God. This is a faith that is open to
critique and criticism, and open to rethinking and reimagining as is intellectually
warranted.7
But how accurate is this assessment of negative theology, particularly as it applies to
Dionysius? It is telling that the book from which the quote is derived, The Divine Names,
is a book discussing fundamental predicates of God found in and legitimated by
revelation. However, this quote from Dionysius tends to leave the impression that such
discourse is ultimately futile and even unsuitable in relation to divine majesty. In his
Mystical Theology, Dionysius also says of God, “It cannot be grasped by the
understanding since it is neither knowledge nor truth.”8 Why, then, does he write a
discourse on the Divine Names, and even mentions (hitherto undiscovered) texts he has
written, such as the Theological Representations, which have “…praised the notions
which are most appropriate to affirmative theology”?9 Charles K. Robinson has also
painted a similar picture as Taliaferro and Meister regarding Dionysius in particular in his
article “Theological Predication in the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas.” Robinson asks,
“In regard to Dionysius, the fundamental question is, what is the Ultimate Being which is
the object of his approach?”10 He answers, “It would be a remarkable piece of
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Taliaferro and Meister, Contemporary Philosophical Theology, loc. 909-915, Kindle.
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Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in Complete Works, 141.
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Ibid., 138.
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Charles K. Robinson, “Theological Predication in the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas,”
Anglican Theological Review 46, no. 3 (1964): 304, accessed February 7, 2017,
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.csbsju.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=34&sid=f82f1ea1-4a7a49f5-a7be-b834d1af4a12%40sessionmgr120&hid=118.
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understatement to say that it is not the personal, self-revealing God and Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ. As a matter of fact, it is quite impossible to say what he is
approaching. There is no need of laboring this point further. The very heart of mysticism
is its renunciation of all content.”11 But is this also clearly indicated by the Dionysian
corpus and the context from which it arose? Is Dionysius fundamentally interested in a
renunciation of all content?
The central goal of this discussion is to contrast this excessively apophatic view
of Dionysius with a more nuanced portrait of his theological method. In order to clear up
these apparent discrepancies and bring clarity regarding the Dionysian project, it will first
be necessary to look at the Dionysian corpus as a whole, and only then can we develop a
coherent picture of Dionysius’ vision for doing theology. It will become apparent that
Taliaferro’s and Meister’s concerns about Dionysius are only partially correct at best, and
that fully understanding his method for doing theology and setting theology’s place
within the Christian life will show just exactly what value Dionysius places on
affirmative theological statements.
Dionysius and his Methodology
Introduction
It is of first importance to provide adequate historical background information on
the nature of the body of work associated with Dionysius. This is integral not only for
understanding the content of the Dionysian corpus, but also for understanding how
Dionysius has been received throughout history. Once this foundation is in place, I will
exposit the theological epistemology contained within the corpus, focusing primarily on
11

Robinson, “Theological Predication in the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas,” 304-5.
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the limited yet necessary appraisal of affirmative theology within the thought process of
Dionysius.
Historical Background
First, the “Pseudo-” part in the relatively modern name given to Dionysius should
be explained. For centuries up until the time of the Renaissance, the Dionysian corpus
was believed by many to have been written by Dionysius the Areopagite, who was one of
the few converted to Christianity by Paul after speaking in the Areopagus in Acts 17:34.
However, it has since been confirmed that the writer of the Dionysian corpus was, in fact,
not the Pauline convert. The primary reason for casting doubt upon the idea that the first
century Dionysius the Areopagite wrote the Dionysian corpus was the anachronistic
Neoplatonic (and particularly Proclean) flavor that pervades the corpus. It is clear that
Proclus, who was a Neoplatonic philosopher that existed around three centuries after the
original Dionysius would have lived, heavily influenced our Pseudo-Dionysius. For
example, Proclus was heavily interested in mediations between the One and the many,
often taking the flavor of triads that link the myriad things distinct from the One.12 This
Proclean view of triadic mediation is apparent in Dionysius’ Celestial Hierarchy, where
angels are grouped in triads that mediate between God and humanity, as well as the
triadic, mediating nature of bishops, priests, and deacons found in the Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy.13

12

See Radek Chlup, Proclus: an Introduction (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 125-127; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, 2nd ed. (London, UK: Bristol Classic Press), 153-54.
13

See Paul Rorem, Pseudo-Dionysius: A Commentary on the Texts and an Introduction to Their
Influence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), 52; Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (New
York, NY: Continuum, 2001), 13.
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There have been a number of suspects throughout the history of Dionysian
research for the identity of the pseudonymous author. There has been general agreement
that the author would have written probably in the early sixth century, due to the late
Neoplatonic influences as well as aspects of the letter that reflect the mixed reactions to
the Council of Chalcedon in 451. There is a distinctly Antiochene flavor in Dionysian
Christology that some have argued implies a monophysite view akin to Severus of
Antioch.14 Historically, some have even suggested that Severus himself may be a prime
suspect for being Dionysius.15 Despite these conjectures, little can be known with
confidence as to who Dionysius was. All that we know is that he is not the Dionysius of
the Book of Acts as previously thought.
What, then, is the significance of our pseudonymous writer taking on the name of
Dionysius the Areopagite? Again, no certain answer can be ascertained, but there is one
answer that appears to be most plausible when one considers the nature of the contents of
the Dionysian corpus. There is good reason to think that the choice of the pen name
Dionysius the Areopagite was quite deliberate. In Acts 17, the biblical Dionysius is
converted after Paul’s speech to the philosophers at the Areopagus, and the primary
theme of this speech was proclaiming the unknown god as the God of the Christians. On
one hand, this pseudonym reflects the fact that the imports of pagan philosophy that have
truth to them can and should be used by the Christian to clarify and promote the gospel.
As Andrew Louth puts it, “The pseudonym expressed the author’s belief that the truths
that Plato grasped belong to Christ, and are not abandoned by embracing faith in
14

Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 13-14.
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Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality,” in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete
Works, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 12-13.
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Christ.”16 17 On the other hand, the theme of an unknown god will become apparent as the
theme of apophaticism in the Dionysian corpus is explored.
Overview of the Dionysian Corpus
The extant works that are comprised of the Dionysian corpus consist of the
Celestial Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Divine Names, the Mystical
Theology, and ten writings stylized as letters addressed to various monks, deacons,
priests, and bishops. The Celestial Hierarchy is fundamentally about the role of angels as
mediators between the One and mankind as well as their triadic ranks defined in the
manner of order within the hierarchy, form of understanding conveyed to lower ranks,
and activity by which they may become as much like God as possible for their rank.18
The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy then lays out similarly triadic church authorities that are
bishops, then priests, then deacons, each ecclesial rank having a similar threefold manner
of definition as the celestial ranks. However, most of the discussion below will center
around Dionysius’ two main theological treatises, the Divine Names and the Mystical
Theology, as well as various important statements found in the letters.
It is also worth noting that there are several works by Dionysius that are alluded
to in his writings that we either have not discovered or that have never existed. Among
these, the ones most applicable to our discussion include the Theological
Representations, in which Dionysius claims to have “…praised the notions which are
16

Louth, Denys the Areopagite, 11.
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One may also note Charles Stang’s interpretation of Dionysius’ pseudonymity that implies both
Paul’s desire to bring philosophy and Christianity together at the Areopagus as well as intimating an
interest in Pauline apophatic anthropology. See Charles M. Stang, “Dionysius, Paul, and the Significance of
the Pseudonym,” in Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite (UK: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2009), 11-26,
Kindle.
18

Rorem, Dionysius: A Commentary, 57.
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most appropriate to affirmative theology,” and the Symbolic Theology, where Dionysius
claims to have “…discussed analogies of God drawn from what we perceive.”19 The
nature of these two undiscovered or fictitious works by Dionysius (particularly the
Theological Representations) will eventually play an important role in clarifying
Dionysian methodology and the role of theological affirmations.
The Divine Names
The Divine Names is the longest of all of Dionysius’ extant treatises, and it deals
primarily in discussing the use and validity of the common names for God found in the
Bible, such as light, good, or beautiful, as well as more fundamental metaphysical names
such as being or life. It is here in this treatise that the appraisal of kataphatic theology is
most apparent. It is here that one ought to begin consulting before approaching the
Mystical Theology in order to have a well-rounded understanding of Dionysius’
apophatic methodology. The reason for this suggestion will be made clear further below
once the ideas contained in the Divine Names have been established.
The primary backbone of the methodology found in the Divine Names is found in
divine revelation. In his introduction addressed to Timothy, Dionysius says,
Here… let us hold on to the scriptural rule that when we say anything about God,
we should set down the truth “not in the plausible words of human wisdom but in
demonstration of the power granted by the Spirit” to the scripture writers, a power
by which, in a manner surpassing speech and knowledge, we reach a union
superior to anything available to us by way of our own abilities or activities in the
realm of discourse or intellect. This is why we must not dare to resort to words or
conceptions concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being, apart from
what the sacred scriptures have divinely revealed.20

19

Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, in The Complete Works, 138-139.

20

Dionysius, The Divine Names, in The Complete Works, 49.
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This foundation in revelation is crucial for Dionysius’ attempt at discourse concerning
divine names and attributes. The statements of Scripture, according to Dionysius, are not
only the source of knowledge when it comes to adequate divine names, but it is also the
primary authority for the validity of discussing divine names from a human perspective.
Dionysius qualifies his statement that “…we must not dare to apply words or conceptions
to this hidden transcendent God” by also saying, “We can use only what scripture has
disclosed.”21 He goes on to say that, though God is ultimately unsearchable and
inscrutable, He is also “…not absolutely incommunicable to everything.”22 For
Dionysius, the Bible supplies the theologian with the appropriate terms and names that
one may use to refer to that God who is ultimately unknowable and unspeakable. An
implication of this reality is the fact that names and attributes can be used to point to God
because the Bible, as revelation from God, says that it is valid. Dionysius intends for this
limitation to be more prescriptive than restrictive. Dionysius also states in the same
chapter, “For, if we may trust the superlative wisdom and truth of scripture, the things of
God are revealed to each mind in proportion to its capacities; and the divine goodness is
such that, out of concern for our salvation, it deals out the immeasurable and infinite in
limited measures.”23 For Dionysius, not only is Scripture prescriptive of the prospect of
finding finite information about God through the study of all things, but also God has
accomplished this revealing primarily for soteriological reasons. In this scheme, the Bible
as revelation remains the fundamental means by which we may be permitted to possess
names for God found through meditating on special and natural revelation, while
21

Dionysius, The Divine Names, in The Complete Works, 50.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.
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simultaneously justifying those who accurately (and accidentally) endeavored in this task
apart from knowledge generated from special revelation.
What is further, the authors of revelation “…praise [God] by every name—and as
the Nameless One.”24 Since God is the Cause of all, even of being itself, one may, in a
way, attribute to God every name given to all things, since all things bear the mark of
their creator. From this it is clear where Dionysius has justification for composing a text
like the Symbolic Theology. Since the Scriptures make claims for the perceivability of
God’s power in creation (particularly in passages such as Romans 1:18-23), there is
legitimacy behind the endeavor of giving names to God, though ultimately his essence is
beyond word or concept.25 Because God chose to disclose truths about himself through
natural and special revelation, the truth of God’s radically transcendent essence does not
contradict the importance and efficacy of theological knowledge and research.
Throughout the Divine Names, the operating pattern appears to be that the
kataphatic and the apophatic are two sides of the same coin. Dionysius finds it
worthwhile in chapter two to articulate a clear understanding about divine unity in
relation to Trinitarian doctrine, yet finally recognizing the supra-conceptual nature of the
Triune Deity.26 In chapter four, Dionysius even attempts to give a working definition of
God as the Good, all while also arguing that evil is not a substance.27 He even tries to

24

Dionysius, The Divine Names, in The Complete Works, 54.

25

Ibid., 75.

26

Ibid., 58-61.

27

Ibid., 71-84.
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give an answer to the problem of evil, a task that is clearly done by kataphatic
theologians and philosophers throughout centuries.28
From these examples and more within the Divine Names, it is clear that Dionysius
is not against affirmative statements about God and his attributes, nor does he view
conceptual system building as superfluous or unfruitful. Yet, for Dionysius, this does not
contradict the fact that God is ultimately unknowable and indescribable in his essence.
Dionysius addresses the problem of reconciling the two impulses this way:
It might be more accurate to say that we cannot know God in his nature, since this
is unknowable and is beyond the reach of mind or reason. But we know him from
the arrangement of everything, because everything is, in a sense, projected out
from him, and this order possesses certain images and semblances of his divine
paradigms. We therefore approach that which is beyond all as far as our capacities
allow us and we pass by way of denial and the transcendence of all things and by
way of the cause of all things. God is therefore known in all things and as distinct
from all things. He is known through knowledge and through unknowing.29
From this passage, it is apparent that some sort of causal “top-down” knowledge
extending from creature to Creator can be both attainable (within its limits) and useful for
the Christian life.30 For Dionysius, it is fitting that a Christian should gaze upon the
whole of creation and come to some sort of conclusion, however partial, about the nature
of God, since God is revealed as Cause in the Scriptures. And yet, there is also a way of
denying all attributes of God as inadequate that is also appropriate for the Christian, even
“more accurate” than the affirmative way. How do these two different paths relate to one
another? Are they purely equal in the eyes of Dionysius, or is there some sort of
hierarchy between the two? Dionysius will develop further clarification on these
28

Dionysius, The Divine Names, in The Complete Works, 84-96.

29

Ibid., 108-109.

30

The Platonic elements that are in play in this quote and others will be discussed below. For now,
it will suffice to say that the reality of God’s revelation through nature does not necessarily depend on an
emanationist interpretation of Dionysius’ doctrine of creation.

14

questions if we look at his next crucial treatise on the knowledge of God entitled the
Mystical Theology.
The Mystical Theology
The Mystical Theology is the shortest single treatise that Dionysius produced
(besides the various letters attributed to him). It is also the ultimate expression of the
complete Dionysian method found within the extant body of his written work. With the
background of the value judgments concerning the positive and negative ways to
knowledge of God found in the Divine Names, we will be able to further clarify the
fundamental theological epistemology that is at the backbone of what Dionysius is
attempting to say and unsay about God.
Again, in the Mystical Theology the fundamental operative term and placeholder
for representing the divine relationship to all things is that of Cause. This is the fulcrum
by which affirmative statements can be made through reason and empirical evidence. As
Dionysius states, “Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all
the affirmations we make in regard to beings…”31 However, Dionysius indicates a sense
in which it is “more appropriate” to “negate all these affirmations, since it [God]
surpasses all being.”32 From this subtle shift in his language, the beginnings of a
Dionysian apophatic method can be developed. Dionysius ultimately begins with the
affirmative statement, particularly through observing the physical world and pondering
metaphysical questions such as the nature of being. However, it is proper and necessary
to then deny these positive attributes developed through these conceptual means. Since

31

Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in The Complete Works, 136.

32

Ibid.
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the essence of God is ultimately unknowable and beyond the reach of man’s finite
thinking, there is theological reason for suspicion for the accuracy of concepts about the
nature of God. Thus, for example, Dionysius states that we must say that God is the
Cause of all the physical world, containing the potentiality of all the universe within his
divine nature,33 yet surely most orthodox Christian theologians would agree with him that
materiality would be denied of God.34 However, Dionysius would take this itinerary of
denial further towards the realm of considerably more fundamental assertions about God.
He comes to the conclusion that we must ultimately deny of God the quality of life, mind,
understanding, power, and even being.35 God cannot be grasped and comprehensively
understood by the human mind, and thus our theoretical concepts about the divine nature,
however accurate, never truly pass for a thorough or complete picture of it. The
movement of denial of all our affirmations about God is ultimately recognition that the
ideas and pictures of God we create in our minds are inadequate when measured up to the
actual infinity of the divine.
It may help to further develop this negative move from the positive way by way
of Dionysius’ Neoplatonic image of downward and upward movements in relation to
God. The downward movement, which corresponds to the “top-down” process of
affirmative theology, moves from the Cause to its effects, making the Cause more
knowable through garnering information about Him by going from the highest and most
divine effects (such as the ranks of angels) all the way down to the most simple, least
33

See Chapter Four of the Divine Names for an extended discussion of this point.
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“It [The Cause of all] is not a material body, and hence has neither shape nor form, quality,
quantity, or weight.” In Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in The Complete Works, 140-41.
35

“It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or understanding…It
has no power, is not power, nor is it light…It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.” In
Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in The Complete Works, 141.
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divine-resembling physical objects. In his description of his non-extant Theological
Representations and the Symbolic Theology discussed briefly in his Mystical Theology,
Dionysius states that this form of argument “…traveled downward from the most exalted
to the humblest categories, taking in on this downward path an ever increasing number of
ideas which multiplied with every stage of the descent.”36 This downward descent thus
takes all of the properties garnered through rational examination and attributes all of their
potentialities to the Cause that contains them. However, to limit the scope of God’s
nature to being Cause of Being and all beings is to fail to do justice to the whole infinite
nature that God possesses. Dionysius is not convinced that the landscape of our legitimate
attributes about God approved by his revelation are meant to give us a totalizing picture
of God’s essence, since the same revelation in Romans 9:33-34 asserts his
unsearchableness and inscrutableness. Thus to form concepts about God are only the
beginning of the theologian’s task.
The next movement that must be done is the move upward towards the divine,
thus leaving behind concepts generated through the previous downward process.
Dionysius’ describes the main move in the Mystical Theology as rising “…from what is
below up to the transcendent, and the more it climbs, the more language falters, and when
it has passed up and beyond the ascent, it will turn silent completely, since it will finally
be at one with him who is indescribable.”37 The negations of otherwise useful
affirmations about the nature of God is “more appropriate” in the sense that one may
more adequately approach the divine through a humble recognition of the inadequacy of
human concepts to comprehend the reality of the divine. For Dionysius, the true
36
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theologian does not rest satisfied in merely determining God through his relationship with
creation. He compares the process of denial of all beings to the process of sculpting,
where the sculptor “…removes every obstacle to the pure view of the hidden image, and
simply by this act of clearing aside they show up the beauty which is hidden.”38 The goal
of this denial is paradoxically to reveal somehow that which cannot be revealed, denying
all things “…so that we may unhiddenly know that unknowing which itself is hidden
from all those possessed of knowing amid all beings, so that we may see above being that
darkness concealed from all the light among beings.”39 This negative ascent, which
begins with the more obvious denials such as that of God as air or stone, eventually ends
with the more disorienting denials for most orthodox Christians, such as the denial of
God the possession of goodness or life.40
Without any more qualifications on the nature of this upward ascent to the Cause
of all beings, an obvious problem appears to defeat Dionysius’ desire to negate
affirmations.41 To simply deny a particular affirmation does not mean that this negation
cannot be cast alternatively as another affirmation. To say that God does not have being
does not inevitably mean that God cannot have some sort of “supra-being” that merely
has not been thought of or perceived by man. Thus, the critique goes, the negation
ultimately falls back upon another affirmation. The negation of divinity for God entails
the possession of a supra-divinity that likewise may or may not be conceptualized in
theory; the denial of goodness merely concedes to a supra-goodness that has not, or
38
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possibly cannot, be conceived by human beings. Thus, to understand Dionysius in this
way entails that his negations merely land on a different, less graspable position that
nonetheless can be used within an affirmative theological system. This would mean that
Dionysius never truly takes off from the affirmative realm of theology after all.
In response, a further clarification needs to be made as to the negative segment of
Dionysius’ apophatic method. The negative aspect of Dionysius’ method can, in fact, be
split into two separate stages. The first of these stages is indeed that movement that is
referred to by critics of Dionysian apophaticism. The affirmations made of God are first
denied as strictly true, leaving open the interpretation as to what deliverance is left over
from this denial. However, there is one final move that Dionysius makes after this second
stage. This is the stage where ultimately language breaks down completely and is
subsequently left behind. This “third way” is the final outcome of Dionysius’ method.
The Mystical Theology first hints at this breakdown of language through its opening
prayer, where Dionysius prays to the Trinity, “Lead us up beyond unknowing and light
up to the farthest, highest peak of mystic scripture, where the mysteries of God’s Word
lie simple, absolute and unchangeable, in the brilliant darkness of a hidden silence.”42
Elsewhere in the Divine Names, God is described as being “indivisible multiplicity” (a
naturally Trinitarian notion) and “unfilled overfullness.”43 Denys Turner has rightly
observed how the usage of paradoxical phraseology, such as “brilliant darkness” and the
hidden silence of God’s Word, reveal that there is more than a simple negation of
positions in view for Dionysius, but rather “…the collapse of our affirmation and denials
into disorder, which we can only express, a fortiori, in bits of collapsed, disordered
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language, like the babble of a Jeremiah.”44 Language itself, according to Dionysius,
ultimately must be put aside through a deferral of words and concepts as means for
relating to God. Later on, Dionysius brings greater conceptual clarity to the nature of this
third way: “Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of
the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond
privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.”45 Therefore, this third way is an
act, or maybe rather an event, that signifies a certain disposition or relationship towards
the One who is beyond affirmation and negation, beyond being and non-being, beyond
knowing and unknowing. Speaking of Moses’ ascent, a theme often used since the time
of Origen to signify the ultimate mystical relationship with God, Dionysius describes the
third way in these terms: “Here, renouncing all that the mind may conceive, wrapped
entirely in the intangible and the invisible, he belongs completely to him who is beyond
everything. Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely united to the
completely unknown by an inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by
knowing nothing.”46 For Dionysius, the true theologian eventually leaves behind the
realm of position and negation altogether, moving beyond language once their usefulness
and limits have been exhausted.
What exactly is the nature of this third way, or, more specifically, what is its end
result? Naturally, the third way inherently defies linguistic conventions, since from it one
abandons the used of language and conception altogether. Dionysius is particularly
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cautious in using descriptions that are merely placeholders for the reality of this kind of
relationship with God, saying that one will be “neither himself nor someone else.” It is
reasonable to assume that Dionysius simply has in mind a total union with or absorption
into God as the end of the third way. However, this conclusion is too hasty. To imply a
monistic union with God is to bring out a conceptual picture of the nature of the third
way that is not balanced in Dionysius’ sense. To be “neither himself nor someone else”
does not make the state of being “supremely united to the completely unknown” a simple
case of a Platonic unitive state. As Turner points out, “such an unbalanced emphasis on
union at the expense of the distinct identity of the soul can claim no support whatever in
the dialectics of Denys’ apophaticism,” for “…in the description of the soul’s oneness
with God we have no language, because that union transcends it, in which it would be
possible to contrast the union of the lovers with their distinctness of identity.”47 A
description of a person who is neither himself nor someone else is clearly another
instance of the limits of language being met, much like the “brilliant darkness” in the
opening prayer. The leaving behind of language entails the leaving behind of events or
states that may be the proper domain of language.
This is not to say that there are no feasible ways of describing the third way. First,
it can be said that the state of the third way is fundamentally relational. It is clear that
some sort of direct “I-Thou” connection with God as the unknowable One is the goal and
aim of this journey from the kataphatic to the apophatic. Andrew Louth even argues that,
on top of the interpretation of the Mystical Theology as a model of personal mystical
ascent found frequently in later appropriations, there are significant liturgical echoes
within the book that detail the particular movements that the hierarch performs from the
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Scripture readings and hymns to the consecration of the hosts.48 While Louth cites usage
of the Mosaic mystical ascent imagery in the Mysical Theology as an almost certain
indicator of influence from Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses (and thus legitmating to an
extent the more personal mystical interpretations of the Mystical Theology prevalent in
the West), he also notes, “Several times in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy the hierarch’s
experience of the liturgy is spoken of in terms that recall the language of the Mystical
Theology (especially I.3, which describes the ascent of Moses).”49 It is clear that we must
not lose the forest through the trees. To deny that there is a movement towards God
happening through this apophatic effort would be to lose such a forest.
Second, there are two key words that serve as placeholders for the reality of the
third-way movement for Dionysius. The first, often repeated in the Divine Names, is the
word “praise.”50 The second, mentioned in the opening prayer and elsewhere in the
Mystical Theology, is “silence.” “Praise” evokes from Dionysius a sense of aesthetic
appreciation for the divine. For him, the conceptual “top-down” movement where names
and attributes are generated of the divine serves the heart in its ascension through desire
and joyful pursuit. This is made even more obvious when one takes in the liturgical
context pointed out by Louth. Ideas are means by which the believer travels up in praise
to That which is beyond all word and conception. “Silence” is a trickier notion. It is
tempting to view the silence indicated in the Mystical Theology as merely the denial of
speech. Silence in the Dionysian corpus is likely better understood as the transcendence
of discourse and conceptuality altogether, rather than the opposite of the act of signifying
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through word or thought. Dionysian silence ultimately corresponds with the realization
that communication about God reaches its epistemological limit in the face of the infinite,
and therefore is left behind in favor of dwelling in the mystical “I-Thou” relationship
indicated imperfectly and inadequately by discourse.
Objections concerning the Dionysian Theological Method
From this discussion, certain lines of criticism might be raised. For one, there is
the resistance, particularly derived from Martin Luther and some of his followers, that the
obvious Neoplatonic influences behind Dionysius’ apophaticism bring suspicion on his
theological method. Thus Luther says of Dionysius, “In the Theologia Mystica—rightly
so called—of which certain pretentious, but very unscholarly, theologians make so much,
Dionysius is very pernicious, being more of a Platonist than a Christian. In sum, I myself
do not want any believer to give the least weight to these books. So far indeed from
learning about Christ in them, you will be led to lose what you know.”51 This disposition
towards (and subsequent rejection of) Dionysius as a Platonist wolf in Christian clothing
lingers in many corners of Reformation theology to this day.52
Indeed, it would be absolutely fallacious to deny the significant influence of
Neoplatonic thought upon the Dionysian corpus. The theme of negative theology had
been developing in the Greek world within the context of increasing Platonic

51

Martin Luther, “The Pagan Servitude of the Church,” trans. Bertram Lee Woolf, in Martin
Luther: Selections from His Writings, ed. John Dillenberger (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1962) 343.
52

It would be well to note that Platonism as such is not the primary critical target of Luther as
such. The fundamental critique is that, for Luther, Dionysian apophaticism in its Platonic flavor
fundamentally detracts from the soteriological truth of the gospel of Christ. Luther suggests this statement
as an alternative to Dionysian theology: “Rather, let us listen to Paul, that we may learn of ‘Jesus Christ and
Him crucified’ [I Cor. 2:2]. ‘He is the way, the truth, and the life’ [John 14:6]. He is the ladder by which we
may come to the Father; as He Himself said: ‘No one cometh unto the Father, but by me.’” See Luther,
“The Pagan Servitude of the Church,” in Selections, 343.

23

otherworldliness at least since the time of Plato.53 Plotinus (204-270 CE) was insistent
that “…we can and do state what it [the One] is not, while we are silent as to what it
is...unable to state it, we may still possess it.”54 Also like Dionysius, Plotinus made the
crucial qualification of negating the positive-negative distinction by putting the One
beyond word or concept. Speaking of the One, he remarks that “…neither rest nor
movement can belong to that which has no place in which either could occur; centre,
object, ground, all are alike unknown to it, for it is before all.”55 Many scholars have
debated whether Dionysius had any affiliation with the later Athenian School, since many
of their themes resonate within the Celestial Hierarchy and the Ecclesiastical
Hierarchy.56
It would be also wrong, however, to disregard the influence of Platonic thought
on the vast majority of the development of the early orthodox church. One cannot ignore
the legacy of those like Justin Martyr and Origen on this point. A responsible theologian
would admit that there is a difference between appropriative similarity and outright
syncretism. It is helpful to note that the primary explicit justification for apophatic
theology for Dionysius comes from his understanding of Scripture. He does not quote
Plotinus or Proclus as justification, nor does he resort to bare philosophical theology
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outside of a Scriptural and liturgical context.57 Parallels do not necessarily imply an alien
co-opting of Christian imagery, and Dionysius offers no positive evidence that the
Scriptural basis is being ultimately trumped by outside sources in order to justify his
theological method.58 59
Formal Restatement of the Dionysian Method
Before defending the Dionysian theological method, it will be of further help to
succinctly extract the fundamental nature of it. In the Dionysian theological method, there
are essentially three stages. First, there is the stage of making affirmative statements
about God. These statements are ultimately founded on revelation and tradition, yet they
are not limited to them, since revelation says that Heaven and Earth declare the glory of
God. These affirmative statements are valuable and necessary for the Christian’s
approach to God. However, they serve as means to higher ends in the life of a Christian,
that ultimate end being union or communion with God Himself. In this sense, affirmative
theology operates as the first step on the ladder that approaches God.
The next step is the initial path of negation. The Christian comes to this path when
she realizes that the concepts we develop about God, while not entirely false, fail to
measure up to the reality that theological concepts try to indicate. For example, while it is
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right and true to say that God is good or holy, it is mistaken to assume that God’s
goodness or holiness is close to how humans conceive goodness or holiness, since, as
stated earlier, revelation declares that He is unsearchable and inscrutable. Thus, the
second phase of the Dionysian method is to deny the affirmations made about God, not
because they are not useful, but because they ultimately cannot do complete justice to the
grandeur of the reality of God. A corollary to this second move is that negative
statements about God tend to be more accurate than positive descriptions about God’s
nature. Thus, to say that God is invisible or infinite is slightly more accurate (and thus
slightly more appropriate) than to say that God is good or just. That God is not visible
entails a more open-ended and incomplete description about God’s nature than to call
God just. To use a Platonic example, the word “justice” conjures a myriad of images in
the human mind, like a court judge, a police officer, or perhaps more abstract definitions,
but never really the pure essence of justice. In contrast, being invisible is simply the
statement of lacking the property of visibility. This statement thus does not further
assume the nature of this lack of visibility. However, this does not finally complete the
Dionysian method. As stated earlier, most (if not all) of these negative statements can be
restated in a positive light; “infinite” could be coherently restated as “perfect” in an
Anselmian sense, for example.
Dionysius was likely aware of this particular conundrum concerning negative
theology, and this is why he goes even further than negating the affirmations in his final
“third way.” This third way, which consists of a deferral of both affirmation and
negation, is a move that is neither linguistic nor conceptual. In this phase, there is a final
transcendence of all discourse in favor of a non-conceptual relational direction towards
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God. The word that is most often used by Dionysius to describe this third action is that of
“praise.” As has been stated earlier, the ultimate goal of the Dionysian method is not
elucidated in coherent detail, but I believe that his frequent usage of “praise” as the
placeholder for the upward movement towards God is telling. There appears to be a
fundamental appreciative characteristic to what Dionysius is trying to get at with the
name of praise. The third way for the Dionysian method implies a worshipper-Worshiped
relationship that is released from the affirmation-negation or linguistic-conceptual
confines that initiate the theological pursuit of God.
There is also an epistemological element that precedes this doxological movement
towards God, though of a more phenomenological variety rather than that of bare
conceptuality. The doxological part of the third way is initiated when all effort to posit
and then deny attributes about God prove to be ill-equipped to penetrate and grasp God in
his essence. This conceptual failure then provides fuel for wonder and awe, as well as an
impetus to approach or relate to God directly (as much as one can) while leaving behind
conceptual deliberation about Him.
An important implication of the third way’s ambiguity is that there is room for
interpretation as to what this relation to God may be; some mystical traditions may
heartily posit that there is a union of sorts, while other traditions might be hesitant to
make statements that appear to imply the elimination of identity in the final relational
phase. For instance, some evangelical Protestant thinkers find the vocabulary of union to
be problematic terminology that takes away from the strict difference between creature
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and Creator.60 Of course, Dionysius verifies none of these individual schemes explicitly.
Indeed, he would likely argue that putting words to the nature of the third way is to
ultimately serve as a meager placeholder for the actual reality. Therefore, the openness of
possibilities for describing the third way appears to permit a wide variety of competing
Scripture- and tradition-based pictures.
Ethical Reasons for the Dionysian Method
In contrast to the boundaries set by the Dionysian method, much of modern
thought, thanks in part to the post-medieval ascent of reason as the highest authority,
views thinking about God through the hermeneutics of what will be arbitrarily termed
“metaphysical modernism.” This is the view that our ideas and concepts about God’s
attributes do a good job (some even a perfect job) of getting at the fundamental nature of
God. Thus, William Alston describes the general confidence of Anglo-American analytic
philosophy of religion to determine the fundamental nature and character of God to an
exceedingly significant degree. “No one thinks we can attain a comprehensive knowledge
of God’s nature and doings. But on many crucial points, there seems to be a widespread
confidence in our ability to determine exactly how things are with God.”61 The
summative description that describes the mood or disposition of metaphysical modernism
is “intellectual confidence.” On this view, our idea of God formed through Scripture and
tradition can potentially be reliable enough that humans can achieve an (mostly) accurate
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picture of the person and nature of God. If we use our reasoning faculties properly, we
can develop a system of thinking that is both accurate and predictable concerning who
God might be and what God may value.
On the face of it, this seems to be a reasonable position to hold. Christianity is
fundamentally a revelational religion. God chose to reveal Himself through creation, the
scriptures, tradition, and ultimately through the incarnation of Jesus Christ, giving us a
glimpse into his character and love. The Bible, along with passages proclaiming God’s
mystery, encourages the pursuit of knowledge: “The mind of one who has understanding
seeks knowledge, but the mouths of fools feed on folly” (Prov. 15:14). There seems to be
ample reason, then, to assume that human concepts about God developed through these
revelational means ought to be highly reliable and worthy of confidence.
However, the fundamental ethical danger that comes with this confidence is the
potential for the perennial sin of idolatry. Idolatry, of course, is a sin that not only
involves physical objects, but also objects of emotional or conceptual varieties. One
fundamental example of the sin of conceptual idolatry found in the Gospels is that of the
learned Pharisees. Jesus castigates the Pharisees’ idolatry in John 5:39-40, declaring,
“You search the scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is
they that testify on my behalf. Yet you refuse to come to me to have life.” The insight
that Jesus brings in this reprimand should serve as a caution to any who are confident that
their view of God is at least mostly accurate. The Pharisees used their rational faculties to
derive from the Bible a system of theology that nonetheless completely ran counter to the
nature of the true God revealed in Christ. Paul, discussing the eventual salvation of Israel,
exclaims in Romans 11, “Oh the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!
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How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known
the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?” (11:33-34) There appears to be
implied in these verses a disposition of wariness in the concepts that are developed about
God and his ways. Man is prone to idolatry of the mind, and some of these idols may be
more near and dear to the mind than one may think.
Again, this is not to say that the Dionysian method desires for an individual to
turn off her reasoning abilities completely or ignore revelation. However, it is proper to
take the ideas conjured from the affirmative first stage of the Dionysian method with a
grain of salt as well as with thanksgiving while moving onto the stage of negation. God is
“unsearchable” and “inscrutable” and is conceptually “higher than our thoughts”; the
most appropriate direction one should take toward thinking about God is a path of
intellectually mature acceptance of ignorance.
Metaphysical Modernism and Onto-theology
A related issue that is of more philosophical importance is the contemporary
critique of metaphysics as onto-theology, which can roughly be described as confusing
the property of being with the primary causa sui in metaphysical thought. This technical
terminology of “onto-theology” as the fundamental foundation and error of metaphysics
does not necessarily have the God of Christianity in view, for Martin Heidegger, who
first developed the contemporary meaning of onto-theology, identified any cause or
principle of reality developed by metaphysicians as fair game when it comes to his
critique of metaphysics.62 The fundamental flaw that Heidegger determined with all
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metaphysical systems (including those of metaphysical theism’s “God of the
philosophers”) is that the distinction between the nature of Being and the Cause that
brings about the Being of beings has been greatly confused. Heidegger puts the confusion
this way:
If metaphysics thinks Existence with an eye toward its basis which is common to
every individual Existent as such, then metaphysics is logic in the form of ontologic. If metaphysics thinks Existence as such in terms of the Whole, that is, with
an eye toward the highest all-understanding Existence, then metaphysics becomes
logic in the form of theo-logic. Because metaphysical thinking remains imbedded
in difference which as such is not the object of thought, metaphysics is at one and
the same time uniquely ontology and theology by virtue of the unifying oneness
of the issue.63
For Heidegger, ontology attempts to do justice to two distinct poles simultaneously by
accounting for the nature of Being or Existence and for the nature of the Primal Being or
Existent. Marion describes the task of the onto-logic end of determining what Being is by
stating “…insofar as it is a negation of entity, it is able to ground each and every entity,
including that named ‘God,’ because it makes them both thinkable (according to entity,
indeed to a concept of entity) and possible (conceivable as noncontradictory in a
concept).”64 However, the theo-logical pole of classical ontology puts the foundation of
all beings on some primordial being as a source of being for all that exists. This primal
entity “…not only grounds the other beings in the name of the first cause that gives an

logical Nature of Metaphysics,” in Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Difference (New York, NY:
Philosophical Library, 1960), loc. 331-677, Kindle.
63

Ibid., loc. 634-644, Kindle.

64

Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” in God Without Being: Horse-Texte,
2 ed., trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 202-203, Kindle.
nd

31

account as well but also grounds the being of an entity by bringing it to perfection and
even by bringing into existence the formal characteristics of entitativeness.”65
There are apparently two possible horns of a dilemma that comes from ontotheological metaphysics concerning God. The first horn states that God must be the
conceptual principle of Being that all beings possess. This option is hardly acceptable to a
classical Christian theist, for a conceptual principle is incapable of any personal or causal
processes whatsoever. God as the Being that all beings possess fails to adequately
conform to the fundamental picture of God developed within revelation. God, according
to the Christian tradition, is not merely a fundamental property that all beings possess, but
rather a distinct person inherently independent of creation (though not divorced from it).
In contrast, the other horn has a much greater appeal to the Christian tradition. It states
that God possesses the property of being in the same way that a human or a rock
possesses being. God exists in just the same way that the created order exists. Of course,
there would be a distinction between God as Creator and every other object as created;
nevertheless, God and created things equally are and exist. Though God necessarily exists
in contrast to the contingent existence of creatures, God and all currently existing
contingent creatures possess the same fundamental property of being. For many
theologians, this is a perfectly acceptable option for theology proper.66 After all, would
not a God without being therefore not exist at all?
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A closer look at this position, however, yields questions that, for many, are
unforeseen. What is the ultimate principle behind all things in a worldview where God
falls under the category of being? Most theologians would still posit God as the obvious
answer, but is this really the case? On this worldview, God is just as dependent on
possessing being in the same way that created beings possess being. Again, even though
God is uncreated eternity, on this view he nevertheless has his being established wholly
within the horizon of the property of Being. This implies that Being is the ultimate
foundation for everything that exists, including God. If all things must exist within the
philosophical horizon of Being in order to be meaningfully existent, then to say that God
might be outside of Being would be to say that there is no God. In this sense, it would be
technically a mistake to say that God is the principle of all, since God depends upon the
property of being just as humans and rocks depend on it. Being, therefore, may be
correctly referred to as the foundation of reality, and God would, at best, be the first
participant in the property of being. God, therefore, does not create ex nihilo in a strict
sense, since God imparts or imputes being, the very fundamental property of Him, onto
the created order, rather than radically creating out of nothing. Therefore, on this ontotheological view of reality, there is an endless confusion as to whether God or Being is
truly the ultimate reality.
Dionysian method and onto-theology
However, the horns of the dilemma may be split through the Dionysian
methodology. According to the method imparted by Dionysius, it is not necessary that
God must be posited as the property of Being shared by existent objects, nor is it
necessary to say that God possesses being like creatures do. In order to have an adequate
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third option for this dilemma, it will be necessary to posit God as beyond Being itself.
Dionysius makes reference to God as beyond the category of Being in multiple instances,
both in the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology. In the Dionysian view of God, “It
[God] is and is as no other being is. Cause of all existence, and therefore itself
transcending existence, it alone could give an authoritative account of what it really is,”
and that “…that Cause is superior to being and nonbeings. The name ‘Being’ extends to
all beings which are, and it is beyond them. The name ‘Life” extends to all living things,
and yet is beyond them. The name ‘Wisdom’ reaches out to everything which has to do
with understanding, reason, and sense perception, and surpasses them all.”67 68
A brief discussion of the Dionysian view of “Being” as a name for God used to
praise him is necessary to further grasp Dionysius’ view of the relationship between God
and being. Dionysius’ basic ontology in the Divine Names is repeated as follows:
Being precedes the entities which participate in it. Being in itself is more revered
than the being of Life itself and Wisdom itself and Likeness to divinity itself.
Whatever beings participate in these things must, before all else, participate in
Being…Consider anything which is. Its being and eternity is Being itself. So
therefore God as originator of everything through the first of all his gifts is praised
as “He who is.” In a surpassing fashion he possesses preexistence and
preeminence and he originated being, I mean absolute being, and with that as
instrument he founded every type of existent…The first gift therefore of the
absolutely transcendent Goodness is the gift of being, and that Goodness is
praised from those that first and principally have a share of being. From it and in
it are Being itself, the source of beings, all beings and whatever else has a portion
of existence.69
Again, for Dionysius, God is most properly referred to in relation to all things as Cause.
God is not only the Cause and Source of the material and spiritual universe, but also of
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properties themselves, no matter how fundamental they are. Being, non-being, unity,
multiplicity, light, darkness, truth, falsehood, life, goodness, and wisdom (among many
other basic qualities) are view as creations of the primal and foundational Cause that
preexists all of them. Of course, Dionysius intends to use “Cause” as merely a
placeholder; if “Cause” were to be considered a metaphysically accurate name, the
problem Dionysius would run into is that of explaining how God could be the Cause of
causality. However, the fundamental insight that Dionysius is trying to get at concerning
God is that he is the fundamental generator of all conceivable properties man can reflect
on, from the most complex to the most basic, which includes Being.
Thus, with this radical scheme of systematizing God’s relationship to creation,
Dionysius appears to render the dilemma furnished by the recent critique of ontotheology impotent. God is neither equated with the property of Being, nor is He
essentially confined to possessing the property of being like that of created beings. It also
follows that God-talk is indeed possible independent of the debate on whether
metaphysics is a legitimate form of discourse for philosophy and theology. The
Dionysian view of God and being therefore has great philosophical advantages going
forward in the postmodern milieu that has reared its head for over a half-decade.
Or does it? Crucial objections can be and have been raised against the idea of a
God who is not in possession of the property of being or existence. Does not this position
give way to the conclusion that God does not exist, that there is no God? Taliaferro and
Meister seem to think so: “To contend that God is outside ‘the order of being’ makes
sense if the claim is that God is not a created being. If the claim is that God is beyond or
outside being (or existence), however, it seems that this is to claim that there is no
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God...[T]o claim that something is no-thing seems very close to claiming that something
is nothing.”70 Responding to Herbert McCabe’s claim that God is incomprehensible
precisely because he is the Creator of all things, Taliaferro and Meister reply, “We
suggest that McCabe’s language cannot itself be literal…[I]f God is truly completely
incomprehensible, then it seems that we cannot comprehend that God ‘is Creator of all
that is.’”71 If Taliaferro and Meister are right on this, then it seems that a radical form of
atheism would follow from complete incomprehensibility.
Indeed, the logical problem may be intensified by how Dionysius would likely
amend the objection that to be no-thing appears to simply be nothing, for Dionysius
praises God as wholly preexisting the dichotomy of being and nonbeing altogether. The
very foundations of conceptually predicating properties of God are to ultimately be
abandoned at the end of the Dionysian method, whether it is God as a being or God as
nothing.72 It is apparent that consistency in the Dionysian apophatic method renders moot
the possibility of giving a clear response that may be adequately visualized by any human
mind. It would be like how Augustine defended God’s eternity ontologically prior to time
in Book XI of the Confessions by stating that “You [God] made all time and before all
times you are, and there was never a time when there was no time.”73 The most
appropriate way to respond to this objection is to say that there must be some possible
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distinction between the statements “God does not possess being” and “There is no God,”
or, conversely, to say “God does not exist” can still imply “There is a God.” On some
level, technicality is demanded of the crucial predicates used in these statements. “To
possess being/to be” and “to exist” are here viewed as infinitives that essentially have the
same meaning. Thus, to say that God exists in the sense that God possesses the attribute
of being like the created world and the possible world within the human conceptual
milieu is false. To say that God possesses the property of being like a human, a cat, or a
bicycle possesses being is false, and therefore God does not exist in the way that these
things do. This still begs the question: in exactly what way can we say that there is a
God? The only answer that the practitioner of the Dionysian method can give is “God is
not in any way that any finite creature can be or conceive.” Like the aporia of God’s
eternity, no effort of language can fully comprehend the nature of God’s transcendence
over being and non-being. Our most accurate ideas about God derived through the
condescension of revelation ultimately yield to paradoxes that mark the limits of
language itself in doing God justice. As will be shown later, Thomas Aquinas was crucial
in delineating the difference between God’s “being” and created being.
Though the enterprise of kataphatic theology is absolutely necessary for the
journey of relationship with the Divine, this rational discomfort that one feels at the
seeming absurdity of describing God properly through this linguistic enterprise is
ultimately the sign that one must finally relinquish the positive way of referring to God.
One must become embarrassed at the profusion of conceptual efforts to “think God,” and,
as Turner remarks concerning this awkwardness, “…[T]hat embarrassment has to be
procured, and to reach that point—this is the essence of the cataphatic—it is necessary to
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talk too much.”74 One must praise God by every name under heaven as Cause of all, and
then grow silent through the sheer inadequacy of this process. This useful failure, where
the limits of language are discovered, is what sends the believer into the negation and
subsequent transcendence of the affirmation/negation polarity into the realm of worship.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, the Dionysian method of situating theology thus described begins
with what most Western theologians would conventionally call “theology.” The Christian
is to use her rational faculties (with the aid and permission of authoritative revelation) to
look at the world around her, the world within her own consciousness, and the deposits of
special revelation in order to ascribe appropriate attributes to the Cause of all things. This
is the necessary first step in the Christian’s relating to God, but it is not to be considered
the end. From this properly followed enterprise of theological affirmation, a realization
occurs of the vastness and greatness of God that is unable to be captured through human
conceptual and linguistic conventions. This leads the theologian to negate all of the
attributes ascribed to God from kataphatic theology as inadequate and improper models
for reflecting how God truly is in himself. This is not to say that they are misleading or
deceiving; indeed, one comes upon the fact of the utterly transcendent nature of the
Godhead through the process of affirmative theology, primarily through special
revelation. Thus, the movement from positive to negative is the deliverance of doing
theology properly. Yet to simply negate an affirmation is not enough to transcend
conceptual discourse about God. The old adage for apophatic theology that negative
statements are more appropriate than positive statements is true, but again this is not the
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final end of the Dionysian method. The final end of the Dionysian method is to break
away with linguistic and conceptual discourse concerning God in order to seek a
simultaneously primal and advanced direct relationship with God Himself. This direct
relationship with God has an aesthetic element wherein the Christian enacts a gaze of
praise and wonder. This aesthetic element includes an epistemological element, since one
of the sources of aesthetic response to God in this third step is the ultimate “cloud of
unknowing” in which the utterly transcendent and utterly immanent God resides.
This Dionysian method for situating affirmative theology within the grander
scheme of a Divine-human relationship has both theological and philosophical elements
that are ultimately bound up with each other. Idolatry is fundamentally avoided in the
Dionysian method, since no concepts concerning God and his attributes are given an
absolute and certain authority. The statements from special revelation, along with the
deliverances of general revelation authorized by special revelation, are not rendered
unnecessary, but are qualified particularly from special revelation that God’s nature is
beyond what man can make of these deliverances. God’s goodness and power are real,
but the human effort to conceptualize what it means that God is good and omnipotent are
immeasurably inadequate to show God’s nature in its infinite fullness. From a
philosophical point of view, the Dionysian method is likewise successful in avoiding the
problematic dilemma of onto-theology in such a way that God is beyond being, rendering
Him outside of the trappings of modern metaphysics.
An objection might be raised as to whether this Dionysian method could be
applicable to any theologian who is outside of the realm of postmodern theology or
phenomenology of religion. It is my intent that the preceding exposition of Dionysius’
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methodology gives good reason to think that there is a potentially universal viability to
incorporating Dionysius’ view of theology into theological work today. However, this
argument for the usefulness of the Dionysian view of theology is not restricted to abstract
argumentation. There have been numerous theologians throughout the history of the
Church who have held a high regard for doing affirmative theology, yet simultaneously
incorporated an approval of the Dionysian methodology. Time and space will not permit
an investigation of every theologian who was influenced by Dionysius in this manner,
but, for the sake of brevity, two theologians will be discussed below who are both
influential and dissimilar in many ways, yet incorporated the Dionysian methodology in
their own distinct framework. The first theologian I will discuss is Thomas Aquinas, that
titan in the history of metaphysics and natural theology. The second I will discuss is Hans
Urs von Balthasar, who, much like Dionysius, perceived a triadic notion of experience of
God as the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. The purpose of discussing the Dionysian
influence on these authors is to cast a wide and concrete net concerning how applicable
Dionysius is to efforts of theological work. Dionysius will be shown to be for the
formulators of great theological systems, and not merely for the silent mystics.
Thomas Aquinas and Dionysius
For those with only a cursory knowledge of Thomas Aquinas, it might come as a
surprise that this prominent theologian might be relevant to a discussion of the Dionysian
method. After all, Aquinas is a monolith within the history of natural theology, a
discipline that is considered a grave sin to many who are prone to be critical of ontotheology. Indeed, it would seem that Aquinas’ Aristotelian insistence that theologia is a
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scientia might cast significant doubt as to whether Dionysius had any relevant effect
upon Aquinas’ thinking.75
And yet, it is often said that Dionysius is the most quoted extrabiblical source in
Aquinas’ entire corpus besides Aristotle.76 Though this appears to be the case, lengthy
discussion on the degree in which Dionysius influenced Aquinas has been a relatively
recent emergence.77 Much of this discussion has been situated within the relatively recent
study of the Neoplatonic influence upon Aquinas; after all, his reception of Aristotle was
very much by way of the translations of medieval Islamic Platonists. It will be useful to
examine the impact of Dionysius’ meta-theological method on Aquinas by first
examining his commentary on the Divine Names, particularly the sections that discuss the
epistemological methods developed within the Divine Names, namely the Proœmium and
Chapter 1, Lectio 1. Afterwards, a defense will be presented concerning Aquinas’
faithfulness to the meta-theological methodology spelled out in the Dionysian corpus,
particularly in response to the claims of John D. Jones that Aquinas practiced
unfaithfulness to Dionysian thought through his efforts toward a theological scientia.78 I
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will then briefly situate Dionysius’ influence upon significant points in Aquinas’
theology, particularly within the Summa Theologiæ.
Aquinas’ Commentary on the Divine Names
Aquinas’ In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio is particularly
significant because of how much Aquinas is able to find concordance with Dionysius’
thought on the knowledge of God, while at the same time is able to put forth his own
originality concerning the ideas posited within the Divine Names. To begin with, In
Chapter 1, Lectio 1, Aquinas grapples with the question of why it is that God is not
entirely comprehensible to the human mind. The answer Thomas gives is that, in fact,
God is infinitely knowable, but can only be comprehended fully by an infinite mind.79
God has constructed the human mind only to be able to comprehend him in a finite sense
through reason and the senses. Aquinas formulates this neatly when he says, “Et ideo
sicut essential divina est supersubstantialis, [Dionysius] ita et [eius] scientiam
supersubstantialem dixit. Semper enim oportet obiectum cognitivae virtutis, virtuti
cognoscenti proportionatum esse.”80 In order for something to be fully comprehended,
there must be a concord between the fullness of the thing known and the ability of the
knower to fully cognize it. There is no fully comprehending God by humans, though this
is not through any defect in God; rather there is a God-designed limitation to the human
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capacity to know his essence. Thus, a “knowledge of the super-substantial” is inherently
possible, but it can only be partial for humanity’s finite reasoning capacities.
However, like Dionysius, Aquinas does not think this means theological talk is
fruitless. God has communicated a portion of knowledge concerning himself through
Scripture and tradition, but also through the sensible world and the measure of
participation in God’s nature given to human beings.81 Aquinas even goes so far as to say
that the goodness of the divine nature necessitates that he reveal some of himself: “It
would indeed be against the nature of divine goodness that God should retain for himself
all his knowledge and not communicate it to anyone else in any way whatsoever, since it
belongs to the nature of the good that that it should communicate itself to others.”82 For
Aquinas, participation, as opposed to mere abstraction, involves a mystical contemplation
of God such that one conforms to the ideal image of God more fully.83
Aquinas is in agreement with Dionysius in Chapter 1, Lectio 1, Paragraph 6-8 that
the fundamental source for the names of God must be found in the special revelation of
the Bible. As O’Rourke puts it, Aquinas views Dionysius’ Divine Names as functioning
“…by not relying on human reason, but by drawing strength and security from the
authority of Scripture.”84 However, this does not contradict the proposition that some
fundamental names for God, such as Being and Goodness, are discoverable through
metaphysical reflection based on sense perception. Indeed, because revelation reveals
81
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names concerning God that resemble qualities found in the domain of the sensible realm,
this gives reason authorization to reflect on the causal principle of all things within this
realm. According to Aquinas’ position, as O’Rourke delicately puts it, “Reason may
respond to revelation when presented with those truths of God for which a likeness may
be found in finite beings.”85 Though Dionysius only hints at the reality of Divine names
derived from creation in his descriptions of the Symbolic Theology, it will be shown
below that this principle is crucial for understanding the affirmative project Aquinas put
forth in his various metaphysical efforts.
In light of this validation of affirmative theology, Aquinas qualifies the
fundamental limitation of theological discourse:
Sed quia omnis similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficiens est et hoc ipsum quod
Deus est omne id quod in creaturis invenitur excedit, quicquid in creaturis a nobis
cognoscitur a Deo removetur, secundum quod in creaturis est; ut sic, post omne
illud quod intellectus noster ex creaturis manuductus de Deo concipere potest, hoc
ipsum quod Deus est remaneat occultum et ignotum.86
Here, the crucial principle is that, no matter how valid our theological categories are or
how in line with Scripture and tradition they may be, God vastly exceeds the potential
human measure of these categories. Humanity’s most well-rounded and comprehensive
idea of God as the Good nonetheless falls immeasurably short of grasping the totality of
what it might mean for God to be the Good. Speaking of even the most fundamental ideas
described in the Divine Names, such as “life” or “essence,” Aquinas says, “Non solum
enim Deus non est lapis aut sol, qualia sensu apprehenduntur, sed nec est talis vita aut
essentia qualis ab intellectu nostro concipi potest et sic hoc ipsum quod Deus est, cum
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excedat omne illud quod a nobis apprehenditur, nobis remanet ignotum.”87 Aquinas
thinks that concepts like life or essence as properties of God, though appropriate as far as
they go, nonetheless fail to encompass all that these can possibly mean in relation to God
compared to creaturely life or essence. Thus, Aquinas agrees with Dionysius that
affirmative theology, though necessary, is not completely fulfilled. It can be seen that the
degree of Aquinas’ agreement with Dionysius’ fundamental insight is profound, but it
will be helpful to show how Dionysius has impacted Aquinas’ own theological efforts, as
well as how Aquinas has appropriated the Dionysian method with his own distinct
emphases.
Dionysian Influence upon Thomistic Thought: the Triplex Via
A major touchstone in Dionysian influence upon the thought of Thomas Aquinas
is in his triplex via,88 or three ways, of achieving knowledge of God. O’Rourke notes
how, in Aquinas’ commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, Aquinas speaks of the ways as
per causalitatem, per remotionem, and per eminentiam.89 Per causalitatem refers to
giving affirmative statements about God concerning more intelligible qualities (Being,
Life, etc.) in reference to God as Cause of all of these intelligible qualities. The via
remotionem refers to the negation of all sensible creatures insofar as they fail to be God.
Finally, the via eminentiam refers to how God transcends human concepts altogether.
One can find in Aquinas’ commentary on the Divine Names a sign of the Dionysian
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influence concerning the triplex via.90 The fundamental source of this triplex via seems to
be from the Divine Names, where Dionysius describes the approach to God as passing
“…by way of the denial and transcendence of all things and by way of the cause of all
things.”91 For Aquinas, the terms “denial” and “transcendence” both indicate the
individual movements of the via remotionem and the via eminentiam, respectively,
though this unique interpretation may be making two movements where there is merely
one implied in the original text.
It could be argued that the process of the triplex via is a total reversal of the
Dionysian formulation in Book 7 of the Divine Names; Etienne Gilson has made such an
argument.92 However, there is no contradiction between Aquinas’ apparent order of
operations and that of the Divine Names Book 7. For one thing, it is not necessary to
assume that, in this particular passage, Dionysius’ order of denial, transcendence, and
cause are meant to be followed linearly. Indeed, the main thrust of Dionysius’ method
found throughout his corpus is more in line with how Aquinas organized his plan.
O’Rourke notes, “…[I]n contrasting, for example, human cognition with the
transcendence of God’s nature, [Aquinas] may give primary significance to negation and
eminence; in the order of discovery, however causality is given priority, since it is
immediately accessible.”93 Neither Dionysius nor Aquinas are implying a strict itinerary
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in these models, and, therefore, the conclusion of contradiction does not necessarily
follow.
Dionysian Influence upon Thomistic Thought: the Summa Theologiæ
This triplex via of Aquinas’ system, and thus the crucial Dionysian influence
upon Aquinas’ thought, fundamentally is at play within his great theological effort the
Summa Theologiæ. This comes out particularly in Book I, Q. 12 and 13. In Q. 12, Article
12, Aquinas addresses the fundamental question contained within the Divine Names:
Given that we only perceive and conceive of finite reality through our senses and through
reason, how then can we come to know that which is beyond limit, time, and space?
Aquinas asserts, like Dionysius, that we fundamentally cannot see God in his essence,
since no created effect can be equal in conceptual content to the First Cause: “Ex
sensibilibus autem non potest usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam
essentiam videat, quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae non
adaequantes.”94 One can use neither reason nor the senses to fully cognize the depth of
the power of God, since He is beyond all: “Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest
tota Dei virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec eius essentia videri.”95 However, Aquinas
is conscious in Article 12 about how we can know some aspects about God as First Cause
through his creatures, all while preserving the conceptual chasm between finite creation
and the infinite Godhead simultaneously: “Unde cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius
ad creaturas, quod silicet omnium est causa; et differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod
scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non removentur ab
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eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.”96 For Aquinas, natural knowledge of
God is extrapolated by reasoning from objects of sense perception to the one who is the
fundamental cause of all things; yet this does not negate the fact that God superexceeds
all concepts developed through such efforts. Ultimately, Aquinas says that we cannot
know God in his ineffable essence, yet, like Dionysius, we can come to an understanding
of God in relationship to his creation as its Cause.97
Question 13 is more explicitly indebted to Dionysius’ Divine Names, for it is there
that Aquinas discusses the names of God. Because all of the perfections preexist within
the simplicity of God, he may therefore be named by all of the perfections that created
beings finitely possess, in accordance with the Aristotelian notion that every cause is at
least partially reflected in its effects. Aquinas describes this relationship by saying “Quae
quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter: in creaturis vero recipiuntur
divise et multipliciter.”98 He even goes on to say that these perfections exist within God
essentially, albeit more eminently (with the adjective eminentius being a reference to the
via eminentiam).99 However, Aquinas posits that the proper manner of naming God
through these perfections delivers the result that his essence has not been fully grasped.
Like Dionysius, this circumstance of perpetual ignorance concerning the
knowledge of God’s essence fails to imply that statements about God are valueless. A
helpful way that Aquinas presents this is through his argument that the name of God is
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neither completely univocally predicated nor completely equivocal. For Aquinas, the
reason that the name of God can be neither univocal nor equivocal is that both positions
imply that God cannot be the Cause of all creation. Though Aquinas does concede that an
equivocal term must be reduced to the univocal essence of the term, he argues that a nonunivocal source precedes any univocal designation of species. This is so, says Aquinas,
because a univocal agent (i.e. a creature that can be listed under a species) cannot cause
its own species, but can only participate in the meaning of the species it reflects. Thus, a
dog cannot cause of the species “dog,” but can merely participate in it. However, at the
other extreme, to say that names cannot be ascribed to God except by a completely
equivocal sense (the highest of high negative theology) is also inappropriate. If all names
ascribed to God are true in a completely equivocal sense, then it ultimately implies that
there is no relationship between the created order and God, and that nothing whatsoever
can be thought or known concerning God. For Aquinas, as well as for Dionysius, this
concession goes against the testimony of both the philosophers and the Scriptures
concerning God as Cause, and renders all statements about God as invalid.100
For Aquinas, what is ultimately left in splitting the horns of the univocalequivocal dilemma is that of the principle of analogy. For Aquinas, the names of God
derived from creation possess a likeness that reflect God only partially: “Unde quaelibet
creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam
habet, non tamen ita quod repraesentat eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed
sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem
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similitudinem effectus consequuntur…”101 Though the various perfections perceived in
creatures point to the perfections inherent in the divine nature, they necessarily fall short
of equaling the essence of the divine nature. For Aquinas, this is shown from the fact that
man must conceive of the qualities of God, such as “goodness” and “wisdom,”
separately, though in reality there must be no composition in God: “Deus autem, in se
consideratus, est omnino unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas
conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso est, videre.”102
From these considerations, it is apparent that Aquinas’ approach to theological
epistemology is remarkably close to the Divine Names. For Aquinas as well as Dionysius,
we are unable to know God as He is in Himself, yet some measure of Him can be
understood through his causal agency towards creation. Neither effort attempts to reduce
the mystery of God to a platitude, but both see theology as falling short to a significant
degree such that God does not serve as a fully definable and fully comprehensible species
subject to a thorough metaphysical science. Aquinas is not interested in creating an ontotheological “science of God” which would reduce Him to a cog in a metaphysical
machine. With all of Aquinas’ thoroughness in the Summa Theologiæ, he was careful to
defer much speculation as to what is the divine essence.
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Contrasting Dionysius and Aquinas
Of course, we ought not overstep the ground that is gained in the preceding
analysis. To say that Thomas Aquinas is an inheritor of the Dionysian method is far from
implying that he is a replicator of Dionysius. Indeed, there are crucial distinctions
between Dionysius and Aquinas that must be kept in mind so as not to distort our image
of Aquinas as following the Dionysian method. The differences in time, culture, and
intellectual milieu virtually guarantee that Aquinas will not read Dionysius in precisely
the way Dionysius intended to be read. Certain significant differences between what
Dionysius likely thought and how Aquinas interpreted him ought to be taken into account
before coming to a full conclusion of Aquinas’ use of the Dionysian method.
John D. Jones provides a useful critique of Aquinas’ reading of the Divine Names
from the vantage point of the development of Eastern Orthodoxy. The first major critique
that Jones levels at Aquinas’ reading (and likely the entire western Medieval
appropriation of Dionysius) is the fundamental lack of effort in situating Dionysius
within the liturgical and ecclesial context of his time. In much of western Medieval
Dionysianism, with Aquinas included, texts like the Divine Names and the Mystical
Theology tended to be viewed more as speaking towards personal mysticism or
theological reflection and less as related to the liturgical significance it holds in the
context in which it was written.103 An important corollary derived from this phenomenon,
particularly concerning Aquinas’ reading, is the apparent lack of aesthetic or
hymnological themes in his analysis of the Divine Names. Jones notes that, with both the
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content of the analysis made by Aquinas as well as his artificial way of dividing up the
Divine Names according to perceived linear scientific reasoning in Dionysius’ train of
thought, Aquinas’ view and approach to the Divine Names “…are exactly those that one
would expect for someone conveying a science.”104 Jones claims that this intellectual and
epistemological approach fundamentally colors the way Aquinas approaches the Divine
Names. Though Dionysius frequently refers to his efforts in the Divine Names as efforts
of praise, “…Aquinas never indicates that Dionysius is ‘hymning” or ‘praising’ God as
one of the ‘cognitive’ activities in which he is engaged while composing the Divine
Names.”105 In fact, Jones extracts from the work of Aquinas that he tends to give
disciplines like teaching and preaching a higher rank of importance than praise and
music, which is something that Dionysius surely would feel different about.106
Aquinas’ view of the Divine Names as scientific is also a significant point of
potential misreading on his part, according to Jones. He notes that, since Aquinas’ idea of
a science implies the potentiality for seeing the essence of God in the next life, and since
Aquinas portrays the Divine Names as a science, indeed a “skillful” science,107 it is
implied that Aquinas believes Dionysius would concur with him that the blessed see the
essence of God in the afterlife. However, this is far from obviously true, since Dionysius
appears to claim that such perception is inherently impossible for finite minds: “Indeed
the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational process…Mind beyond mind,
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word beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name.”108
One could certainly point out that Aquinas’ vision of the blessed does not equate to an
onto-theological metaphysical grasping of the nature of the divine. Conor McDonough
argues that the kind of knowledge of God in the afterlife should be a more nuanced
concept that perpetually involves a kind of unknowing.109 However, it cannot be ignored
that the Eastern distinction between the inaccessible essence and accessible energies in
God that is likely in play in Dionysius’ theology proper stands in contrast to Aquinas’
view that there is an essence in God that is capable of being known, if only finitely, in the
next life.
Dionysian Method in Aquinas
All of these differences between Dionysius and Aquinas may be granted, and thus
it may be that to call Aquinas a pure Dionysian is inaccurate.110 However, this is not to
say that the heart of the Dionysian method is not at play in Aquinas’ approach to
theology. Even though Aquinas filters the Divine Names through an Aristotelian western
sieve, his carefulness when approaching positive affirmations about God and his putting
them in their proper perspective regarding the reality of God’s ultimate
incomprehensibility remains in concert with the Dionysian method.
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By way of concluding this discussion on Aquinas and the Dionysian method, it
will be helpful to consider what contemporary phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion has to
say as of late about the fundamental difference between Aquinas’ method of treating God
theologically compared to his more onto-theological contemporaries and followers. A
certain set of questions still remain that must be met before we leave Aquinas established
as a practitioner of the Dionysian method. First, how is Aquinas (and also by implication
Dionysius) able to avoid onto-theology and still speak of God as the first cause of all
creation? Second, how can Aquinas also speak of God as actus essendi apart from a
systematic onto-theology? Marion’s later treatment of these issues in his essay “Thomas
Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy” addresses these questions by highlighting the distance that
these concepts imply between God and creatures through the implementation of analogy.
For Marion, Aquinas’ concept of analogy when discussing the nature and essence of God
is not intended to simply comfort the theologian by assuring her that her statements about
God are more or less accurate. Instead, analogy, along with its kataphatic purpose, is
meant to highlight the fundamental disproportionality between what knowledge can be
gained about God through reason and revelation and what is the exceeding amount of
reality concerning God. According to Marion, “For Aquinas, analogy…intended to
emphasize that no name, no concept, no determination should be applied in the same
sense to the creature and to God, especially esse.”111 For Marion, this thesis that the
analogy, and the analogia entis in particular, “…has no other function than to dig the
chasm that separates the two understandings of esse (and not to bridge it),” is ultimately

111

Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” in God Without Being, 212, Kindle.

54

the crucial foundation on which to interpret God as first cause and as actus essendi in
Aquinas.112
The first question dealing with causality appears to clearly evoke one of the main
tenets of onto-theology, which is that there is an entity that is first cause of all other
entities and also is causa sui. Marion does recognize statements that, at first glance,
appear to put God in a metaphysical system as an efficient cause in Aquinas. Take the
statement in the Summa Theologiae that explicitly expresses this: “Ergo est necesse
ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.”113 However,
Marion argues that, contrary to Descartes’ view of God as “totalis et efficiens causa,”
Aquinas does not limit causality exclusively to efficient cause, but also to formal and
final causality, echoing the multiple Aristotelian ways of understanding causality. Not
only this, but Marion also emphasizes the close relationship between Dionysius and
Aquinas when it comes to causal implications of the Divine. Here it is worth reproducing
the quote from Aquinas’ commentary on the Divine Names mentioned by Marion: “Est
autem Deus universalis causa omnium quae naturaliter fiunt,” which Marion translates as
“God is the universal cause of all things that occur naturally.”114 From this kind of
statement, Marion takes the Aristotelian multivocal nature of causality in Aquinas and
draws the conclusion that causality from God is not necessarily reducible to the kind of
causality found within a metaphysical system. Therefore, for Aquinas, causality from
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God “…implies a unilateral not reciprocal foundation: it goes up to the caused from the
cause but never goes back to the cause from the cause.”115 This, of course, is
fundamentally implied from the principle of analogy concerning God-talk. The property
of causality observed in the world can be analogically predicated of God, yet only if it is
understood to be fundamentally inadequate. Marion is correct to conclude, “…[T]his
Thomistic reform of causality allows the cause to produce the esse commune while
transcending it completely.”116 Because the causality of God is not necessarily one that
must be confined to an efficient cause within a metaphysical scheme due to a multivocity
in the definition of causality, Aquinas weaves analogically a theology of creation that has
both the kataphatic and the apophatic operating as two sides of the same coin. Our
analogies are still by nature inadequate, even when they refer to causality.
For Aquinas, this understanding of causality is crucial for demonstrating that God
is not the causa sui of onto-theology. Because God’s mode of causality is distinct (though
not necessarily separate) from that of the causality that exists within a creation that must
necessarily have a cause, it is implied that God is not categorically bound to any type of
prior cause. As Marion states, “…for Aquinas, the infinite and final cause can (i.e. God)
only conclude a finite causality.”117 If God is outside the limitations of causality assigned
to the essence of all causes of creation, then this implies God’s transcendence of
creation’s finite categories of what might be understood as a “first cause.”118
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Likewise, Aquinas’ analogia entis must be understood along these lines. Recall
the distinction between metaphysical theology119 and theology according to revelation.
For Aquinas, metaphysical theology seeks to come to an understanding of God strictly
through his effects in creation without revealing the nature of God’s essence. Only
theology developed from revelation can properly be said to reveal some of the essence of
God to mankind. Aquinas makes this distinction when he says, “Theologia ergo
philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subjectis, de separatis autem
primo modo sicut de principiis subjectis. Theologia vero sacrae Scripturae tractat de
separatis primo modo sicut de subjectis.”120 From this Marion asserts that, in
metaphysical theology, God in his essence is never completely a subject of inquiry; at
best, God is only identified conventionally as the ground of common being. For Aquinas,
says Marion, “…God does not belong to metaphysical theology precisely insofar as He
remains the principle of the subject of metaphysics, that is, of entity inasmuch as it is
entity.”121
From this consideration, it is apparent that God is outside of the limit delegated to
created ens commune when it comes to the sharing of being. The ens commune is
dependent upon God as principle and foundation, but God is not therefore contained
within the horizon of being that is fundamental to creation. Aquinas states in his
commentary on the Divine Names (also quoted by Marion), “Primo quidem quantum ad
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hoc quod alia existentia dependent ab esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse
commune a Deo . . . Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia continentur sub
ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub ejus
virtute, quia virtus divina plus extenditur quam ipsum esse creatum.”122 Since there is
thus a unilateral foundational relationship between God and ens commune in which the
foundation goes from God to common being without any reciprocation, this allows for
the possibility that the analogy of being can be posited in Aquinas’ thought without
thereby rendering God as the simultaneously ground and grounded causa sui. God is the
means by which metaphysical entities subsist and can be thought without being confined
as a proper subject for metaphysical enquiry. The actual being of God, however it may
be, cannot be equated with the ens commune of creation, but only analogized.
Conclusion
For Aquinas, Dionysius’ approach to kataphatic and apophatic theology was
significantly influential in his thought concerning the content and limits of God-talk.
Though many of his explicit disputational quotations of Dionysius seemed to call into
question what may be viewed as extreme apophaticism, the Dionysian method was
implicitly formative in Aquinas’ theological epistemology, particularly his doctrine of the
names of God. Throughout his extensive discussion on matters metaphysical and
theological, Aquinas was careful to approach his work with the Dionysian view that the
attributes of God could never be univocal with those found in creation (while also never
being purely equivocal).
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However, Jones’ insights into Aquinas’ reading of Dionysius should be kept in
mind. Aquinas’ appropriation of the Dionysian method favored heavily on the
epistemological aspect of the method, leaving the hymnological and aesthetic emphases
mostly unexplored. While some may argue that the purpose of the Summa Theologiae is
an effort of praise, this is not explicit in Book 1 of Aquinas’ text and would need further
development.123 Though it is not out of the question (and indeed quite possible given
Aquinas’s work on sacramental theology and his mystical epiphany later in his life),
Aquinas’ use of the Dionysian method ultimately highlighted the epistemological import
of it over the doxological.
Hans Urs von Balthasar and Dionysius
In many ways, the appropriation of Dionysius by Hans Urs von Balthasar
represents an aesthetic emphasis in the Dionysian method that Aquinas appeared to lack.
Though Balthasar’s theological aesthetics in the volumes that make up The Glory of the
Lord also draw upon a number of other early Christian thinkers along with Dionysius,
there is a sense there that Dionysius plays an important role in Balthasar’s aesthetic
reversal of Kant’s priority of reason in apprehending the divine. For Balthasar, Dionysius
is a significant iteration of his model of a theological aesthetics as the foundation of
theology in concert with how the early church fathers operated. Dionysius was viewed by
Balthasar as a prime example of bringing theology in the service of aesthetic
apprehension, and thus an example of “seeing the Form” par excellence, within the
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context of early church thought, and it is with this in mind that Balthasar incorporates the
Dionysian method within his theological aesthetics.
Balthasar and The Glory of the Lord
One must first get a bearing upon the overall project of Balthasar’s theological
aesthetics before discussing what Dionysius specifically means to his theological project.
There are three fundamental phases to Balthasar’s project: the aesthetic, the dramatic, and
the logic. The Glory of the Lord corresponds to the aesthetic element of Balthasar’s
theology, which is also, for Balthasar, the foundation upon which he builds his theology.
Balthasar rightly observes the lack of aesthetics as a central part of theological discourse
in the modern West; rather, it has been a peripheral consideration at best:
Beauty is the last thing which the thinking intellect dares to approach, since only
it dances as an uncontained splendour around the double constellation of the true
and the good and their inseparable relation to one another. Beauty is the
disinterested one, without which the ancient world refused to understand itself, a
word which both imperceptibly and yet unmistakably has bid farewell to our new
world, a world of interests, leaving it to its own avarice and sadness. No longer
loved or fostered by religion, beauty is lifted from its face as a mask, and its
absence exposes features on that face which threaten to become incomprehensible
to man. We no longer dare to believe in beauty and we make of it a mere
appearance in order the more easily to dispose of it.124
Balthasar responds to this lack of aesthetic emphasis by negating the modern, postKantian view of aesthetics and returning to more classical conceptions of the beautiful
divine, including that of the church fathers. Balthasar is intending to retrieve the
mentality of seeing God as fundamentally beautiful (though, as shall be shown below,
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this does not entail that God as fundamentally good, true, and Being is negated in this
proposition).
Balthasar bases his theological aesthetics in what appears to be a
phenomenological approach, an approach that begins with the perception of the classic
transcendentals of the Beautiful, the Good, and the True (all which correspond to his
theological aesthetics, dramatics, and logic, respectively). Of course, Balthasar is not
doing phenomenology in the sense it was done in his time, where perception was
primarily an epistemological horizon.125 Again, there is a sense that this
“phenomenology” is based upon classical sensibilities about reality that even predate
Christianity, including those of ancient Greece. For Balthasar, the Good and the True are
not purely distinct categories, but are instead involved in a dance with the Beautiful.
Thus, the Beautiful is simultaneously the Good and the True. This perception is what
differentiates the more rationalist pistis and the intimate gnosis that belongs to true faith,
a faith that is compelled not just by propositional truths but also by the drawing beauty of
God.126 From this foundation, Balthasar then goes on to use the analogia entis to identify
God as the transcendent source and cause of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. In
particular, Balthasar views the revelation found in the incarnation of Christ Jesus as the
fulcrum of how aesthetics and culture in general are to be viewed and evaluated, since He
is the prime display of the transcendental forms. In Christ, the beauty of God is revealed
simultaneously with the glory of the perfect man whose “…concordance between his task
and his existence may be traced back to the fact that he does not do his own will but that
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of the Father, that he has not therefore given himself this task but rather accepted it in
obedience.”127 Thus, Christ represents the ideal harmony between divinity and humanity
realized. In all, Balthasar is interested in bringing aesthetics as the first principle of
theology, with ethics and logic being developed once the fundamental aesthetic has been
described. As intimated earlier, this is an intentional reversal of Immanuel Kant’s trilogy
of critiques that begin with pure reason, then practical reason, and finally aesthetics. This
is not merely a stylistic convention, but an intentional symbolic reversal of modern
thought’s tendency to privilege reason as superior to aesthetic matters.
In Volume II of The Glory of the Lord, Balthasar deals with what he calls
“clerical styles” of doing theology that have this aesthetic element as foundational during
early and medieval church history. Balthasar summarizes the purpose of the project of
volume II by iterating, “…[I]t must be emphasized that the formal object of this
investigation is the glory of the divine revelation itself, in the multiplicity of its
manifestations and understandings, and then, certainly, within that glory theological
beauty as such, in its transcendence over all models of secular beauty.”128 Balthasar
foreshadows in the beginning of Volume 1, “God’s truth is, indeed, great enough to allow
an infinity of approaches and entryways.”129 This general sentiment is why Balthasar is
concerned about the variety of perspectives that may see the Form that is the incarnate
Christ. The goal is to show how different subjects react to the revealed Form that is
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Christ and how these subjects did so on a fundamentally aesthetic level typical of much
of classical thought.
One must first take note of Balthasar’s intentions in incorporating Dionysius
within his own theological effort. Many scholars have been critical of the somewhat
subjective nature by which Balthasar treats the church fathers, Dionysius included.
According to Tasmin Jones, “Balthasar’s primary motive in ‘listening to the Fathers’ is to
learn how to translate (and not simply replicate) them into something of value for his
own intellectual context. Those unsatisfied with his approach most often accuse Balthasar
of ‘eclecticism’ and also a certain “ahistoricism’.”130 Balthasar is open about how he is
not intending to be an independent and objective exhibitioner of the texts of the church
fathers:
Being faithful to tradition most definitely does not consist . . . [in] a literal
repetition and transmission of the philosophical and theological theses that one
imagines lie hidden in time and in the contingencies of history. Rather, being
faithful to tradition consists much more in imitating our Fathers in the faith with
respect to their attitude of intimate reflection and their effort of audacious
creation, which are the necessary preludes to true spiritual fidelity. If we study the
past, it is not in the hope of drawing from it formulas doomed in advance to
sterility or with the intention of readapting out-of-date solutions.131
Certainly it could be argued that, though Balthasar is not exactly exhuming and exegeting
the text on an objective sense, he nevertheless can unearth important aspects that some
may miss through his theological efforts. As Charles Kannengiesser describes Balthasar’s
patristic retrieval, “Von Balthasar focused his contemplative eye on trying to merge the
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demands of modernity, as he experienced it, with the spiritual and metaphysical treasures
of the Fathers whose meaning he kept probing.”132 Still, it is true that Balthasar’s usage
of Dionysius was through a particular theological lens (though to a lesser extent than
Aquinas, as will be seen below).
However one may evaluate Balthasar’s retrieval of the fathers, it will be shown
that he was nevertheless keenly aware of a methodology present within the Dionysian
corpus, a methodology that affected the form of the Dionysian corpus as well as its
substance. Balthasar’s sense of what Dionysius was trying to accomplish in his writings
with regard to theological aesthetics offers a complementary perspective of the Dionysian
method alongside Aquinas’ sense.
Balthasar on Dionysius
Balthasar admits of the simultaneously kataphatic and apophatic movements
found within the Dionysian corpus, or, as Balthasar puts it, “…the manifestation of the
unmanifest.”133 For Balthasar, the theophanic manifestation of God is simultaneously real
and indicating a real distance beyond comprehension, evoking the Neoplatonic theme
turned Christian of procession and return as well as that of immanence and
transcendence. For Dionysius, “…every manifestation, even within this world, is such a
manifestation of the unmanifest: were the external splendour of the beautiful and of order
not the splendour of a mysterious depth—of being, still more of life, still more of spirit—
then it would not be the beautiful and would not awaken reverence before the ‘sacred
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mystery made manifest.’”134 For Balthasar, this structure of procession and return is the
fundamental fulcrum by which aesthetic information about God can be displayed while
simultaneously allowing a consciousness of God’s glory exceeding the manifestation for
Dionysius. In the creation, “…there is a proportion suitable to the creature between the
manifestation and what it is that (unmanifestly) is manifest, even if there is a gradually
increasing transcendence of the comprehensible relation.”135 This proportional relation is
what fundamentally justifies ascribing to God all names and simultaneously no name
within the Divine Names. For Balthasar, this is the root of Dionysius’ aesthetic perception
of the divine from which negative theology is sprung. The transcendent God
simultaneously “…gives to the realms of creation a share in himself while safeguarding
the immanent order of all things.”136
From this conceptual fulcrum, it is clear that Balthasar has in mind the analogia
entis as a necessary theme for understanding Dionysius’ doctrine of divine names, as did
Aquinas. However, Balthasar goes further by picking up on the disposition of praise
found within the Dionysian corpus. “Theology is exhausted in the act of wondering
adoration before the unsearchable beauty in every manifestation. It is knowledge, gnosis,
but knowledge that answers to the mystery of beauty in a beautiful fashion, which is to
say in a manner fitting, apt, poised (symmetrōs, en symmetriā).”137 What Balthasar sees in
Dionysius is a tripartite method that goes beyond kataphatic attribution followed by
apophatic denial. In Dionysius there is a third step that is to hymn or praise, this third step
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being enabled by the first two and also the final step that justifies the disciplines found in
the first two. Balthasar puts this Dionysian interplay in vivid language when he says,
If the manner of theology is ‘holy measure,’ its sound is ‘holy celebration’.
Because God is in all things and above all things, being and knowing can only be
a festival and a ‘dance’, a continuous ‘celebration’ of the glory that communicates
itself and holds sway in all things and above all things, a ‘hymn’, a ‘song of
praise’, which has its own laws which must be followed in everything from its
basic conception, the choice of point of view, right down to the least form of
expression.138
The ‘laws’ refer to the fact that, according to Dionysius, everything is simultaneously a
means of praise to God (whether word, concept, liturgy, icon, or any object of creation)
and a veil that conceals the comprehensive depth of God from the admirer. Of course,
this aspect of veiling found in all things operates as another catalyst for praising the
invisible God as invisible.139
Conclusion
It is from this view of Dionysius’ apophatic hymnology that Balthasar can claim
that Dionysius, the archetypal negative theologian of Christianity, “…can be regarded as
the most aesthetic of all Christian theologians, because the aesthetic transcendence that
we know in this world… provides the formal schema for understanding theological or
mystical transcendence (from the world to God).”140 All theophany of divine beauty is
simultaneously informative about and veiling the glory of God, neither purely univocal
nor purely equivocal but expressing an immeasurable place between both poles. From the
testimony of Dionysius, Balthasar sees a crucial corrective to modern tendencies that
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focus on rational understanding without an aim to praise and glorification. Thus,
Balthasar provides a key perspective on the form of the Dionysian methodology in which
a meta-theology is fundamentally in view. In Dionysius, Balthasar channels the neglect of
praise and glory in much of theological literature in the West. Certainly, Balthasar’s more
apparent appreciation for the liturgical and hymnological aspects of the Dionysius corpus
provides a complementary and supplementary approach to the Dionysian method
alongside Aquinas’ more epistemological leanings. Where Aquinas primarily emphasized
the theological aspects of the Dionysian method, Balthasar with equal force emphasizes
the aesthetic and doxological meta-theological implications of the Dionysian method.
Concluding Remarks on Aquinas, Balthasar, and the Dionysian Method
As stated before, the preceding two sections concerning the appropriation of
Dionysius by Aquinas and Balthasar were intended to display the fact that both of these
theologians were examples of seeing the form of the Dionysian method, with Aquinas
emphasizing the theological end and Balthasar emphasizing the meta-theological
aesthetic/hymnological end. Much like how Balthasar viewed the early fathers’
apprehension of the transcendental Form in Christ, two different theologians in two very
different times and cultures have both seen in Dionysius a vital theological form that is
corrective to a hyper-rationalist approach to relating to God.
Thus Dionysius and his method of viewing theology, despite current postmodern
fascination, is most truly effective and meaningful within the revelational context of
orthodox Christianity. To assign Dionysius as merely a forefather of deconstructionist
theories of language is to ignore the cultural, liturgical, and confessional context that
necessarily forms his concerns about theological language. It is not necessary, however,
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to say that Dionysius is completely irrelevant to postmodern concerns. As has been
shown earlier, the Dionysian methodology is able to sidestep the charge of onto-theology,
an issue that is relevant both inside and outside postmodernism. Marion among others
have shown that Dionysius is hardly sneaking in a causa sui through the back door in
positing negative theology. That being given, it is clear that Dionysius’ methodology can
be used within theological systems that are not overly radical in themselves, as in the case
of Aquinas and Balthasar. Dionysius is not directly concerned with philosophical debates
about language in general, but rather the nature of theological language and the purpose
of this theological language discovered through doing theology well.
Practical Application of the Dionysian Method
In light of this discussion, there lies the question of the merit of this methodology.
Why should anyone studying the things of God, including academic theologians,
consciously operate with this methodology in mind? This question is certainly
confounded by the fact that most lay Western Christians, regardless of denomination and
particularly in more conservative Protestant ends, are not encouraged to keep their
conceptual picture of God in check to the degree encouraged by Dionysius. If this kind of
view of theology is so often discarded, why implement what seems to be unnecessary for
the vast majority of functioning Christian cultures?
In response, the answer to this question could be given in a number of ways, not
all of which is permitted by room here. However, it will do to give two “macro” answers
under which it appears most “micro” answers to the question seem to fall. The first
answer involves further development on the first commandment against idolatry in
Exodus 20:3-5: “…you shall have no other gods before me. You shall not make for
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yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on the
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down or worship
them…” The second involves practical matters for those who are ardent students of
theology, especially those who are being formally educated in the discipline.
Dionysian Method and Idolatry
In contemporary times, it hardly crosses the average lay believer’s mind that
idolatry is a real problem. According to many lay Christians, idols are not a valid issue in
today’s Western society, nor are they a meaningful temptation. Our society is
substantially different than, say, ancient Israel, where physical idol worship was a
genuine possibility in order to generate positive agricultural or familial outcomes.
Therefore, according to some, the sin of idolatry was more relevant to ancient cultures
than it is today.
Of course, there are some that are more aware than others about conceptual
idolatry like nationalism, racism, sexism, and other ideologies that may take the place of
God and his teaching. These inclinations often shoehorn God as someone “on their side”
when it comes to these manmade ideologies. This is precisely where the Dionysian
method is able to make a crucial corrective to these tendencies. The Dionysian method is
one that forces the believer to always view her idea of God with a critical eye.
Interpretation and theological conceptualization is always viewed as slippery for the
practitioner of Dionysian methodology. One’s ideas must always be provisional and
changeable when confronted with evidence that counters them.
The need for such flexibility has been exasperated by the rise of modernism,
postmodernism, and globalism in recent years. For the Dionysian, there is an openness to
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hear critiques of one’s ideas about God from any perspective, including ones of
nonbelievers. In other words, Dionysius did not implement his theology strictly within
the construct of polemics. In his seventh letter, Dionysius writes to Polycarp, “I have
never wished to embark on controversies with Greeks or with any others. It is enough for
me first to know about the truth and then to speak appropriately of what I know.”141 The
Dionysian openly welcomes all attempts at idol smashing that may occur within our
thought life concerning who God is and what God prioritizes, regardless of whether or
not such a critique comes from a position of faith. Her idea of God is not an
unchangeable monolith, but instead is more like a block of marble that one must try to
chip away at and form into the most appropriate image of God possible in this life.
Another point of relevancy for this aspect of the Dionysian method is providing
an alternative to the postmodern approach to theology. To their credit, postmodernists
have come to the realization that the prevailing “totalizing metanarratives” of modernism
(whether it be classical Marxism or the Enlightenment ideals that led to Nazism)
ultimately fail to get at an objective sense of truth and inflict conceptual (and even
physical) violence in the process to the exclusion of what is overlooked in these
ideologies. Onto-theology is, of course, one of these narratives that have been subject to
critique in this postmodern process. As indicated earlier, since metaphysics, defined as
onto-theology, has been shown to be deficient in encompassing the truth of being,
philosophers of religion in the Continental tradition have been debating since the middle
of the 20th century as to whether talk about God is possible outside of the domain of ontotheology.
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This is fundamentally the reason that contemporary philosophers have been
reaching back to retrieve Dionysius’ insight. Dionysius is a crucial touchstone in the
debate between Christianity’s ability or inability to transcend onto-theological talk.
However, these postmodern retrievals are not without their problems. Many have thought
that Dionysius is virtually a full-on deconstructionist, critiquing the reliability of
language in general when getting at the truth of any matter. For example, Jeffrey Fisher
argues that “…Dionysius engages in an apophaticism of the most radical
kind…and…Dionysian negative theology is significantly compatible with certain aspects
of Derridean deconstruction.”142 Many others, like Derrida and Caputo, taking the notion
of deconstruction as the standard means of dismantling onto-theology, have doubts as to
whether onto-theology has been avoided by Dionysius. Derrida purports that, while
negative theology of the Dionysian variety intends to deny God the finite category of
existence and presence, it does so “…only in order to acknowledge his superior,
inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being.”143 Caputo likewise affirms that
apophaticism sneaks the concept of being for God in through the back door: “So when
the negative theologian, falling upon our breast and looking up to heaven, sighs that she
cannot name or say a thing about God, she also knows, in secret, even if she knows by
unknowing, that if we call the Vatican guards on her, she has an answer. Way down deep,
negative theologians know what they are talking about; they have not entirely lost their
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way or their balance…”144 For Caputo, “…negative theology drops anchor, hits bottom,
lodges itself securely in pure presence and the transcendental signified, every bit as much
as any positive onto-theo-logy…”145 Thus, for many more secular practitioners of
deconstruction, negative theology ultimately fails to transcend onto-theology in a way
that satisfies their criteria.
However, these contentions of whether Dionysius is a good or bad
deconstructionist are fundamentally missing the revelational and liturgical context that
the Dionysian corpus presupposes. Language is not viewed as slippery and unreliable as a
whole; rather, language is meaningful only because it relates to the fact of a selfcommunicating God from which creation proceeds and then returns in eschatological
fulfillment.146 Conor McDonough rightly notes that the deconstructionist assessment of
Dionysius has mistakenly identified negative theology as primarily concerned with
language, when in fact the foundational focus is a particular theology from which a
hermeneutic then arises. “For him [Dionysius], cataphasis is just as essential as
apophasis, and our approach to God is essentially dialectical. Far from smuggling
‘presence’ in through the back door…Denys is open in his espousing of the ‘metaphysics
of presence’ (as well as disavowing it).”147
Because the Dionysian method comes from the background of faith, it may serve
as a corrective for some of the misunderstandings that are present in postmodernism,
while simultaneously highlighting the benefits that have emerged from postmodern
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critiques of modernism and the Enlightenment. Once it is understood that Dionysius
functions exclusively within the Christian revelational and liturgical context, rather than
merely foreshadowing deconstructionist skepticism toward language, the Dionysian
method serves as a way of approving what is good about the postmodern turn while also
critiquing the modernist assumptions that still lie latent within postmodern thought.
Dionysian Method and the Study of Theology
It is a common threat to anyone studying theology, particularly those who have
invested time and resources into graduate level formal education, that in the process one
may become “burnt out” or spiritually dry in the process. There is always a possibility
coming out of theological study that the endeavor ends up making a more clever devil, to
use C. S. Lewis’ phraseology. On the one hand, intellectual elitism can develop in a
student of theology when the student feels a sense of superiority over the mass of average
believers because she has “done the research.” Not only can this foster a kind of
resentment towards fellow believers, but it can also be a means of stunting spiritual
growth. If a student believes that her academic Bible studies inherently bring one to
spiritual growth and sanctification, and are therefore ends in themselves, this may foster
the belief, whether conscious or subconscious, that little more spiritual growth is needed
for her in this life. Conversely, a student who views theological education as an end in
itself can also find herself spiritually unfulfilled, since such an expectation assumes that
gaining intellectual understanding about the things of God inevitably leads to a more
vibrant and joyful spiritual life. Seminars on theology student burnout commonly held at
many schools show that this implication is not necessarily the case. Academics can feel
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more like a burden than a feast to many students, regardless of the importance of the
subject matter.
The Dionysian method is helpful in studying theology precisely because it does
not treat theology as an end in itself. Dionysius understood that praising and enjoying
God is the primary end to all Christian activity, including academic theological studies.
The method is a reminder of the fundamental purpose of studying good theology, which
is to generate good doxology. Conversely, doxology as an end in itself can have a
significant effect on evaluating the relevance of particular matters of theological debate.
Keeping the goal of right praise of God in mind can be a means of weeding out
theological speculation that has little relevance to this end. This is, of course, not a plea to
limit all studies to the topic of theology proper, for Dionysius is quick to name God as
Cause of all of creation. In fact, for Dionysius there is a sense that all studies, including
science and history, are rightly ordered to the praise of God. The Dionysian Symbolic
Theology appears to affirm (at least from what can be interpolated from references to it)
that God is named through amoebas and Neanderthals as much as through the standard
categories that typically belong to theology.
Conclusion
Dionysius invites the believer to constantly maintain open-mindedness in the intellectual
pursuit of God, as well as to let the mind fuel the heart in the pursuit of praising the
invisible Creator. The apophatic method found within the Dionysian method teaches that
all revelation and knowledge concerning the divine is valuable, indeed necessary.
However, one crucial truth found in revelation is the fundamental incomprehensibility of
God to man’s finite mind. This is not to show the failure of revelation to convey what

74

God intended; rather, it is primarily a function of instilling humility in the student of
theology by instructing her to read the text with an open heart and a willingness to
critique one’s conceptions and interpretations. The text is a necessary springboard on the
way to appreciating God with all names and as nameless.
Thomas Aquinas and Hans Urs von Balthasar were two significantly disparate
theologians who both “saw the form” of the Dionysian method, each with their particular
emphasis. Their incorporating of the Dionysian method shows that Dionysius’ thought is
most adequately done within a confessional and revelational context, rather than being
merely limited to radically skeptical modes of theology such as can be found in
postmodern circles. Dionysian apophaticism does not leave behind all kataphatic talk
about God, but instead recognizes apophaticism as the other side of the coin. Scripture
and liturgy (as well as natural theology as legitimated by revelation) are never abandoned
by Dionysius, but are the indispensable catalysts to a greater apophatic consciousness
regarding the divine and his ineffable nature. Aquinas and Balthasar’s recognition of this
dual-natured aspect of good theology shows how applicable the Dionysian method is to
orthodox Christianity without sacrificing any orthodoxy that may be discouraged in some
postmodernist thought.
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